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This study analyzed preferences for wetland-loss prevention in coastal Louisiana.
Data were obtained through a contingent-valuation mail survey of a random sample of
Louisiana households. Results, based on 511 responses, indicate that respondents have a
strong preference for a short-run program (72.41% chose this program over a long-run
program or no action). Respondents that had higher incomes, were white, had prior
knowledge of ongoing restoration efforts, and had confidence in government were more
likely to support some program relative to no action, as were those citing hurricane,
environmental, and/or climate-change protection as their primary concern. Older
respondents and those with negative perceptions of climate change were more likely to
prefer the short-run over the long-run program. Median net present value of willingness
to pay (assuming 18.37% discount rate) was estimated at $17,491 per household for the
multinomial logit model and $3,307 under the Turnbull lower-bound method.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

In April of 2007 the Louisiana Governor signed Louisiana’s Comprehensive
Master Plan for a Sustainable Coast, which details the state’s plan for restoring and
sustaining the Louisiana coast. This document details the State of Louisiana’s position on
what steps must be taken to sustain its coast that has lost 1.2 million acres since the 1930s
and is, at present, losing 15,300 acres annually (CPRA, 2007). A substantial portion of
this land loss is in Louisiana’s coastal wetlands. The benefits of preventing further loss of
wetlands include storm damage mitigation, providing recreational opportunities, and
protecting valuable ecosystems.
The Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection and Restoration Act (CWPPRA)
authorized federal funds for projects designed to restore, maintain, and prevent the future
losses of Louisiana’s coastal wetlands. Federal and State governments have already
begun to prevent the future loss of wetlands, but a positive perception of these efforts by
the public is important for the continued progress of these projects. The primary reason
for the need of continued support by the public and policymakers is due to the scale of
the projects that are being proposed and the cost associated with sustaining these
ecosystems into the future. At present there is little to no evidence on whether public
support exists.
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Another issue that has arisen over recent years is what type of land loss
prevention projects should be used to maintain coastal Louisiana’s wetlands. Two
prominent types of projects that are being compared are rapid land-building projects,
which build wetlands rapidly through dredging and placement of sediment, and more
natural methods such as river diversions, which take a longer time period to deliver the
sediment needed to prevent losses of wetlands. Both approaches have positive benefits
and drawbacks depending on the objectives of wetlands maintenance and restoration.
Before hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the primary focus of building and preventing the loss
of wetlands was the improvement of the coastal ecosystem, and the more natural
processes such as river diversions were favored because they were perceived to provide
better ecological benefits than does the rapid land-building approach. Due to the
devastating effects of hurricanes Katrina and Rita on human life and infrastructure, focus
has shifted from being solely concerned with ecological to encompassing humanbenefits. Due to this shift more projects have been concerned with restoring and
maintaining wetlands quickly so that the benefits of storm damage mitigation can be
achieved in the near future rather than in the distant future. Hence, more projects are
using the rapid land-building approach to restore and maintain the coastal wetlands of
Louisiana. This is consistent with the findings of Aust (2006) in an analysis of the types
of projects being selected to for the preservation and restoration of coastal wetlands in
Louisiana.
The objective of this thesis is to provide estimates of the value that residents of
Louisiana place upon the prevention of projected future wetland loss. In addition to
providing estimates of the public’s willingness to pay for these projects, this thesis
2

identifies the motivating factors that contribute to public support of the prevention of
projected future wetland loss. Possible motives for support include benefits to the
environment, storm damage mitigation, recreational benefits, impacts on coastal
industries, and combating sea level rise due to climate change.
The research is accomplished through analysis of public preference over three
proposals. The first option, termed the “short run” proposal, is for the prevention of
future wetland loss that will begin in 2015 and maintain current levels of wetlands
through 2050. An alternative, termed the “long run” proposal, is for the prevention of
future wetland loss that will begin in 2035 and maintain current levels of wetlands
through 2185. These options are compared to no action being taken to prevent future
wetland loss. This analysis shows which option between short run projects (where
benefits are obtained sooner but do not last as long), long run projects (which take longer
to implement and provide benefits farther into the future), and no action is preferred.
Also, it shows the factors (and their magnitude) that affect one’s decision between the
three choices.
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CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND

This chapter outlines how wetlands are defined, the benefits they provide, the
trend of wetland loss in Louisiana, and actions taken to prevent future loss and restore
wetlands that have been lost. Louisiana wetlands are some of the most important and
largest wetlands in the United States. Louisiana’s wetlands make up 25 percent of the
nation’s total coastal wetlands. Also, 40 percent of the nation’s total salt marshes are
located in Louisiana (CPRA, 2007).

Definition of Wetlands
A wetland can be defined in many different ways. One of the most basic
definitions would be that wetlands are areas where soil is saturated with water either
seasonally or year round. This commonly occurs where terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems
meet. The Corps of Engineers (COE) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
define wetlands through the relationship of wildlife and water to a land area. “Those
areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or groundwater at a frequency and
duration sufficient to support, and do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically
adapted for life in saturated soil conditions” (LAC pg. 5, 2004) is another way that
wetlands are defined. There are varying types of wetlands that have different soil
saturation levels, plant and animal life, and types of water: salt, brackish, and fresh. The
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coastal wetlands in Louisiana, the object of this thesis, are mostly marshlands. This type
of wetland is submerged at least part of the year, supports water-tolerant grasses and
aquatic plants, but not trees (LAC, 2004).

Benefits of Wetlands
More important than what makes up the wetlands are benefits that wetlands
provide. Louisiana’s wetlands provide many benefits environmentally, commercially, and
socially. Environmentally these wetlands provide habitat for mammals, amphibians,
fishes, and migratory birds. They can also act as nurseries for shellfish and fish. Wetlands
also provide valuable nutrients to surrounding habitats. Louisiana’s wetlands also provide
many functions that improve Louisiana’s water availability and quality. A primary
function is that they act as natural water collection areas. As water moves through
wetlands many processes occur that benefit nature and society. These processes include
cleaning pollution out of the water, absorption of excess nitrogen and phosphorous by
wetland plants, denitrification, and destruction of intestinal bacteria in wastewater (LAC,
2004).
Wetlands also play a vital role in reducing damage from storms along Louisiana’s
Gulf Coast. The wetlands provide a natural barrier for the inland by reducing storm surge
and decreasing wave energy. This can be seen through a comparison of the damage to
Florida’s Atlantic Coast and Louisiana’s Gulf Coast from Hurricane Andrew in 1992.
Florida’s coast does not have the wetland barriers that Louisiana’s coast has, and Florida
received much more damage from the Hurricane Andrew than did Louisiana (LAC,
2004). After the devastation of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, models were used to
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examine the role that wetlands play in reducing storm damage. One such model examined
the hypothetical situation where the wetlands east of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet,
the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway, and Lake Borgne turned into open water eight feet deep.
That model found the if this open water scenario had existed the storm surge from
Hurricane Katrina would have been three to six feet higher in St. Bernard Parish and New
Orleans East (WGPHPLC, 2006). Wetlands also capture storm water runoff that can
cause flooding. Wetlands that make up 15 percent of the acreage in a watershed have the
ability to reduce flood peaks up to 60 percent (LAC, 2004).
The wetlands of Louisiana also play a vital role for the state economy. The
wetlands provide habitat for harvestable animals and timber. Twenty six percent (by
weight) of commercial fish landings in the lower 48 states is provided by Louisiana’s
wetlands. Also, this area is the nation’s largest shrimp, blue crab, and oyster producing
areas (USDC, 2005). Almost 30,000 of Louisiana’s citizens have a job that is provided
through this commercial fishing industry (LDWF, 2005). The wetland timber industry
contributes about $2 billion to the state, along with many jobs for the people of Louisiana
(LAC, 2004).
Louisiana’s wetlands also play an important role in protecting the state’s and the
nation’s energy infrastructure from storm damage. Nearly 9,300 miles of oil and gas
pipelines cross the wetlands of coastal Louisiana (USACE, Nov. 2004). Coastal
Louisiana is also the home of the pricing point for natural gas throughout North America
(Henry Hub), and Port Fourchon is a port and supply point for hundreds of offshore
drilling operations in the Gulf of Mexico. A third of the nation’s oil and gas supply and
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50 percent of the nation’s oil refining capacity is produced or transported in or near
Louisiana’s wetlands (LDNR, 2006).
International commerce infrastructure is also protected by the wetlands. There are
ten major navigation routes that are located in southern Louisiana. The ports in this area
are some of the largest ports in the United States. These ports handle approximately 469
million tons of cargo each year, which represents 19% of the annual waterborne
commerce in the United States (USACE, 2003).
Louisiana’s wetlands also provide enjoyment, employment, and revenue through
many recreational opportunities. In 2001, hunters spent $446 million, anglers spent $670
million, and wildlife watchers spent $165 million in Louisiana. Much of this can be
attributed to the state’s coastal wetlands (LAC, 2004).
Though wetlands are extremely valuable, their value has not always been fully
appreciated. Governments, business entities, and individuals have undertaken practices
that have harmed and decreased the quantity and quality of wetlands. Such practices
include the construction of canals and levees; oil and natural gas exploration, production,
and pipelines; and agricultural practices. Yet, the responsibility does not fall solely upon
humans for damages to wetlands. Natural processes such as subsidence (the sinking of
land below sea-level), saltwater intrusion, wave erosion, tropical storms and hurricanes,
and sea level rise have also played a role in the decrease in wetlands. The combination of
these natural and human activities has been the cause of the wetland loss in Louisiana.
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Historic Wetland Losses
Louisiana has been the one of the states most affected by wetland loss in the
United States. In the colonial days of our country it is estimated that the lower 48 states
had 221 million acres of wetlands. Recent estimates are that only about 100 million acres
remain. The rate of loss since the 1930 has been about 1500 acres per year (LAC, 2004).
Louisiana’s total land loss since 1932 has been about 1,216,000 acres, which is about the
size of the state of Delaware. In the last 50 years, though, the land loss rates in Louisiana
have exceeded 25,600 acres per year, and during the 1990’s the rate has been between
16,000 to 22,400 acres per year. This coastal wetland loss in Louisiana accounts for 80
percent of the total wetland loss in the lower 48 states (LCWCRTFWRCA, 1998).
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita destroyed approximately 128,000 acres of marshlands in a
single hurricane season (CPRA, 2007). If no action is taken to curb this trend, 448,000
acres of wetlands could be lost in Louisiana by the year 2050 (USACE, Apr. 2004). The
dollar value of this loss is estimated at $37 billion by 2050 (LCWCRTFWRCA, 1998).
Yet, this dollar amount does not encompass the environmental, social, and cultural losses
that would be incurred.

Restoration Efforts
Actions have been taken by the state and federal government to prevent wetland
loss and attempt to restore the wetlands of Louisiana. Some of the key initiatives that
have been undertaken are: the Federal Coastal Zone Management Act (1972), Louisiana
Coastal Wetlands Conservation Restoration and Management Act (1989), Louisiana Act
6 (1989), Barataria-Terrebonne National Estuary Program (1990), The Gulf of Mexico
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Program (1991), and Sections 2004, 206, and 1135 of the Water Resources Development
Act (of 1986, 1992, and 1996) (USACE, Apr. 2004).
The most prominent piece of legislation that has addressed Louisiana’s coastal
wetland loss is the Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection and Restoration Act
(CWPPRA, 1990). CWPPRA, also known as the Breaux Act, became law in November
1990. CWPPRA authorized the Federal government to use funds to address wetland loss
across the nation. Louisiana was a major focus of the Breaux Act. CWPPRA is a cost
sharing program between the federal government and states to fund projects that restore,
maintain, and prevent loss of wetlands in the United States. In Louisiana, projects are
sponsored by five federal agencies (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Natural Resources
Conservation Service, National Marines Fisheries Service, U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency) and the State of Louisiana. The total
cost over the life of the program is estimated to reach $2 billion (USACE, 2005). From
1990 to 2006, CWPPRA funding averaged approximately $60 million for each coastal
restoration projects. As of 2006, there are 78 projects costing $624.5 million that have
been constructed, are in the process of being constructed, or have been approved for
construction. In addition, 47 projects that cost approximately $913.4 million are in the
engineering and design phase. The combined benefits of all of the projects are estimated
to be 103,281 acres re-established or protected and 515,213 acres restored. Funding was
reauthorized by Congress for CWPPRA through 2019 (LCWCRTF, 2006).
In 1998 a new plan for the Louisiana coast was published. It was entitled “Coast
2050: Toward a Sustainable Coastal Louisiana.” The overarching goal of the plan was,
“to sustain a coastal ecosystem that supports and protects the environment, economy and
9

culture of southern Louisiana, and that contributes greatly to the economy and well-being
of the nation” (LCWCRTFWRCA pg. 2, 1998). The Coast 2050 Plan provides a set of
restoration strategies for restoring south Louisiana’s wetlands to a sustainable level
(LCWCRTF, 2006). The plan emphasized that CWPPRA was improving wetland, but not
to the desired level. The Coast 2050 Plan called for $14 billion to be spent over the next
30 years starting in 1998. The plan states that the Breaux Act will only address 22 percent
of the land loss problems. Funding was not granted to cover all of the Coast 2050 plans.
The Coast 2050 Plan laid the ground work for the Louisiana Coastal Area study
(USACE, Nov. 2004). The study produced the Louisiana Coastal Area Comprehensive
Coastwide Ecosystem Restoration study report and Draft Programmatic Environmental
Impact Study (DPEIS). Another report on Louisiana’s restoration efforts was LCA NearTerm Ecosystem Restoration Plan: Evolution of Coastal Restoration in Louisiana
(USACE, Apr. 2004). The report identified plans to rehabilitate Louisiana’s coast. The
LCA plan would cost approximately $1.9 billion to implement (LCWCRTF, 2006). The
LCA plan was not funded.
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 provided Louisiana with $450 million over the
following fours years for restoration efforts and to mitigate some impacts of Outer
Continental Shelf oil and gas production. The money comes through the Coastal Impact
Assistance Program (CIAP) in the 2005 energy bill (LCWCRTF, 2006).
Then in 2005, Hurricane Katrina and Rita devastated coastal Louisiana. Reports
estimated that approximately 128,000 acres of wetlands were converted into open water.
The hurricanes also had devastating affects on human life, infrastructure, and property. It
is estimated that the losses of physical capital from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita totaled
10

between $70 and $130 billion (CPRA, 2007). This prompted the State of Louisiana to
restructure the Wetland Conservation and Restoration Authority to form the Coastal
Protection and Restoration Authority. Prior to these hurricanes, planning for coastal
restoration and hurricane protection were separated. After these hurricanes, the CPRA
began considering “hurricane protection and the protection, conservation, restoration and
enhancement of coastal wetlands and barrier shorelines or reefs” jointly (CPRA, 2010).
Over the next few years CPRA began working on a Master Plan that would outline how
to achieve a sustainable coast. In April 2007, the state released the Integrated Ecosystem
Restoration and Hurricane Protection: Louisiana's Comprehensive Master Plan for a
Sustainable Coast (CPRA, 2007). The hurricanes of 2005 drastically changed the
approach to maintaining and restoring Louisiana’s coastal wetlands. Pre-Katrina and preRita protection and restoration efforts were primarily focused on environmental and
ecological benefits of the wetlands. Post-Katrina and post-Rita efforts have become
increasingly more concerned with the protection that wetlands can provide against
hurricane and flood damage.
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CHAPTER III
THEORY

This chapter outlines the theoretical framework and outlines the econometric
model utilized in this thesis.

Welfare Measures

Ordinary and Compensated Demand
The following discussion of demand functions and welfare measures is based
upon Kolstad (2000). Demand functions are derived with the individual’s utility function,
prices for two goods, income, and by assuming the individuals will make decisions that
maximize their utility. Depending on whether income or utility is held constant as price
changes provides either the ordinary or compensated demand function. Ordinary
(Marshallian) demand functions are generated when income is held constant as the price
changes for one of the goods. Compensated (Hicksian) demand functions are generated
when utility is held constant as the price for one of the goods changes. Figure 1 illustrates
one ordinary demand curve (xq(pz,pq,y)) and two compensated demand curves
(hq(pz,pq,U0)) and (hq(pz,pq,U1)), where two goods are represented by z and q, income is
represented by y, and utility is represented by U.
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Figure 1 Comparison of Ordinary and Compensated Demand Curves

The reason that both demand curves are used is the fact that the price effect and
the income effect on demand are of concern in this thesis. Price effect means that as the
price of q goes up individuals consume less q and substitute the decrease with z. The
income effect means as the price of q increases individuals consume less q because of the
decrease to their income. The ordinary demand function encompasses both the price
effect and income effect, but compensated demand only encompasses the price effect.
These two demand functions provide us with different welfare measures. Ordinary
demand functions provide consumer surplus.

Consumer Surplus
Consumer surplus is a typical (Marshallian) measure of economic welfare. It is
not the measure that will be used in this thesis, but it is a good place to start to understand
the consumer welfare measure that will be used. Consumer surplus is defined as the
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difference between what an individual is willing to pay for a good and what that
individual actually pays for the good. This is illustrated in Figure 2. The original
consumer surplus is the area under the demand curve, above the price, P0, and between
the origin and the quantity, Q0. Figure 2 also illustrates how consumer surplus changes
when price and/or quantity changes. Consider a quantity change Q0 to Q1. After this
change, consumer surplus is reduced by the triangle between Q1 and Q0. This change in
consumer surplus can also be interpreted as the individual’s maximum willingness to pay
for an increase in quantity from Q1 and Q0.

P
CS
P0

D
Q1

Q0

Q

Figure 2 Consumer Surplus
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Compensating Variation and Equivalent Variation
The two alternative (Hicksian) measures of consumer welfare, compensating
variation and equivalent variation, are provided through the compensated demand
function. Compensating variation is the amount of income compensation that would keep
the individual at the original level of utility given a change in quantity of the good.
Kolstad (pg. 303, 2000) describes compensating variation as “the amount of money that
would keep an individual at the original level of utility with the change” in quantity.
Equivalent variation is the change in income that is equivalent to the change in quantity.
Kolstad (pg. 303, 2000) describes equivalent variation as, “the amount of money that
would move the individual to the new level of utility without the change” in quantity.
Using the same demand curves as in Figure 1 a comparison of the consumer
surplus (CS), compensating variation (CV), and equivalent variation (EV) can be shown.
Figure 3 illustrates the comparison of these three welfare measures.
In this illustration the price of z drops from p0 to p1 which causes the individual to
expand consumption of z from z0 to z1. Due to this price change consumer surplus
increases by the area ABFD. Compensating variation associated with the reduction in
price of z is the area ABED, and ACFD is the equivalent variation associated with the
same price reduction. Figure 3 also illustrates that the area of the three measures may be
different.
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Figure 3 Comparison of Consumer Surplus, Compensating Variation, and
Equivalent Variation

Compensating Surplus and Equivalent Surplus
Two very closely related measures are compensating surplus and equivalent
surplus. Compensating surplus and equivalent surplus are the same as CV and EV
concepts applied to goods for which the consumer cannot choose the quantity.
Compensating surplus and equivalent surplus were used to measure consumer welfare in
this thesis because the object of study is an environmental good, where quantities are
fixed. Equivalent surplus and compensating surplus are illustrated in Figure 4. In Figure
4, income is on the vertical axis (representing consumption of all other market goods) and
the non-market environmental good (in this case, coastal wetlands) is on the horizontal
axis. Utility is expressed through the two indifference curves Iu0 and Iu1, and in this case
16

both are assumed to be functions of income and the quantity of land. Utility at all points
on Iu0 is also assumed to be greater than the utility at all points on Iu1. Iu0 is the initial
indifference curve that represents the beginning level of utility. As a result of the
reduction in the quantity of land from L0 to L1, utility decreases as the consumer moves
from Iu0 to Iu1. This change moves the individual from the starting point A to point B.
Equivalent surplus will be the decrease in income that has the same effect on utility as the
decrease in the quantity of land. In this example equivalent surplus is the difference
between income levels I0 and I1.
This equivalent surplus is also the individual’s maximum willingness to pay to
prevent the reduction of land from L0 to L1. By paying the difference between I0 and I1 the
individual moves from point A to point C. Compensating surplus, on the other hand, is
the increase in income that will return the individual to the original utility level given the
decrease in the quantity of land. In this example compensating surplus is the difference
between income levels I0 and I2. The compensating surplus is also the individual’s
minimum willingness to accept compensation for the reduction of land from L0 to L1.
When the difference between I0 and I2 is accepted the individual moves from point A to
point D. As with the welfare measures in Figure 3, the equivalent surplus and
compensating surplus in Figure 4 do not appear to be equal. This is due to fact that the
equivalent surplus and compensating surplus have different reference points. The
difference stems from equivalent surplus being a payment by the individual and
compensating surplus is compensation to the individual. Willig (1976) addresses the issue
of possible differences between these measures, their differences from consumer surplus,
and validates the use of these as welfare measures.
17

Figure 4 Equivalent Surplus and Compensating Surplus of Income for Land

Willingness to Pay Versus Willingness to Accept
This thesis will measure willingness to pay to prevent future coastal wetland loss
in Louisiana and willingness to accept to allow for the same wetland loss. This section
provides a discussion of the difference between willingness to pay and willingness to
accept that is based on Haab and McConnell (2002). One explanation for the difference is
prospect theory or loss aversion where an individual’s decision is based upon the net
change relative to the status quo, but not by the individual’s well-being before and after
the change is highlighted in Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Another explanation for the
disparity between the two when considering public goods is the fact that individuals lack
the ability to substitute between public and private goods, Hanemann (1991).
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There is empirical evidence indicating that willingness to accept is higher than
willingness to pay. Brown and Gregory (1999) report that numerous studies valuing
environmental goods have found willingness to accept estimates to be 2 to 5 times higher
than that of willingness to pay. Horowitz and McConnell (2002) show that willingness to
accept can be up to 27.57 times higher than willingness to pay, with a mean of 10.41
times higher than willingness to pay, for public and non-market goods.
Willingness to pay has become the preferred measure partly because it is believed
that stated preferences cannot be obtained through a measure of willingness to accept
because it is not incentive–compatible, meaning individuals have no incentive to reveal
their true preference. Another reason for using willingness to pay is that willingness to
accept does not place a budget constraint on the decision maker. Even though willingness
to pay is hypothetical, the respondent is still instructed to consider the loss to income that
would occur by giving a willingness to pay value. The NOAA Blue Ribbon Panel was
asked to determine the validity of the contingent valuation method, which commonly
utilizes willingness to pay estimates. Their determination and recommendations are
outlined in Arrow et al. (1993). The NOAA panel addressed this issue of willingness to
pay versus willingness to accept in their report. The NOAA panel states that willingness
to pay is the more conservative measure, of the two, and recommends the use of
willingness to pay over willingness to accept in contingent valuation studies for this
reason. The NOAA panel confirmed the validity of willingness to pay estimates derived
from the contingent valuation methods, but it gave guidelines for the how contingent
valuation studies should be performed to provide reliable estimates. These guidelines will
be highlighted in the next section.
19

Both measures are estimated in this thesis and a comparison of the median
willingness to pay and median willingness to accept measurements are conducted. The
reason that both willingness to pay and willingness to accept measures are used is
because it was not obvious as to where the respondents would perceive the property
rights of the wetlands to lie. If respondents perceived the property rights of wetland
benefits to lie with them then it is necessary to know what they would be willing to
accept to give up the rights to those benefits. The reason willingness to accept is used in
this scenario is the individual’s value is the minimum value that they are willing to accept
the loss of the wetlands. Whereas, if respondents do not perceive the property rights to
belong to them, then willingness to pay to prevent the loss of wetlands is the measure that
should be used because it is being determined what they would pay to gain the rights to
the benefits provided by the wetlands. The reason willingness to pay is used in this
scenario is the individual’s value is the maximum amount of money that the respondent is
willing to pay to prevent the loss of the wetlands (Champ, Boyle, and Brown, 2003).

Contingent Valuation
Contingent valuation is a technique of deriving demand for a good through asking
an individual how much they would be willing to pay for a good. Their willingness to pay
is contingent upon a market actually existing for the good (Kolstad, 2000). This
procedure is commonly used to value environmental goods because many environmental
goods do not actually have a market in which they are traded. Examples of contingent
valuation include asking individuals how much they would be willing to improve their
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hometown’s air or water quality or how much they would be willing to pay to prevent
climate change.
Davis (1963) was the first to use contingent valuation in academic research. This
study used a contingent valuation survey to elicit the value that hunters and wilderness
lovers placed upon a recreational area. Since then the contingent valuation method has
been used in many areas of economics. In addition, contingent valuation methods have
been improved. Yet, due to the method’s importance and the opinion of some researchers
that contingent valuation was not a legitimate method of valuing goods, the U.S.
government requested that a high-level review of the procedure be undertaken in 1992.
Diamond and Hausman (1994) and Hanemann (1994) present two differing views on the
legitimacy of the contingent valuation method. This review was partially in response to
contingent valuation’s proposed use to value the damage from the 1989 Exxon Valdez
Oil spill. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration gathered a panel of six
highly distinguished economists and survey researchers, lead by Kenneth Arrow. This
panel became known as the “NOAA panel.” The task of this panel was to review
contingent valuation and determine if it was a legitimate method. The NOAA panel
decided that the method could be useful, but that certain practices should be adhered to in
order to generate reliable willingness to pay values (NOAA, 1993).
Kolstad (2000) provides a discussion of the NOAA panel’s recommendations for
a successful contingent valuation survey. The six components of a successful contingent
valuation are defining the market scenario, choosing the elicitation method, designing the
market administration, sample design, designing the experiment, and estimating the
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willingness to pay function. The NOAA panel made recommendations about the best way
to accomplish each of these components.
Defining the market scenario involves conveying to the respondent all the
information about the situation on which they will be making the decision. The NOAA
panel recommends asking questions that make sure respondents understand the market
situation and that the respondent should be reminded of any substitutes. Choosing the
elicitation method means establishing how the willingness to pay value will actually be
obtained. The four main ways of eliciting are direct questions (open-ended), bidding
game, payment card, and referendum choice. The recommended elicitation method is
referendum choice. The reason it is recommended is because most people are accustomed
to answering such questions (e.g., voting) and it reduces bias introduced by the researcher
arbitrarily or systematically choosing prices that may not allow for respondents to
indicate values. The market administration is how the respondents take the survey. The
main methods are in-person, telephone, internet, and mail. The NOAA panel
recommends in-person, but this is the most expensive administration method and often
times not financially feasible. Sample design involves two steps. The first is to choose the
population from which to draw the sample and the second is to draw a random sample.
Experimental design is very important to performing an effective contingent valuation
study. Experimental design involves deciding which questions to ask and how to ask
them so that will provide the data needed to perform research. The final component is to
estimate the willingness to pay function. The estimation of willingness to pay must be
kept in mind throughout all planning and design components to insure that all data
needed is obtained.
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The contingent valuation method has been utilized previously for wetland
valuation. Examples include Costanza and Farber (1987), Costanza, Farber, and Maxwell
(1989), Bergstrom, Stoll, Titre, and Wright (1990), Whitehead (1990), Farber (1996),
Milon and Scrogin (2006), and Petrolia and Kim (2009). Although not a contingent
valuation study, Farber (1987) was also reviewed because it was one of the early attempts
to value the wetlands of Louisiana. This study attempted to place a value on the
Louisiana’s coastal wetlands based upon their role in the reduction of wind damage to
property due to diminished storm intensities.
The purpose of Farber and Costanza (1987) was to estimate the value of the
wetland system in Terrebonne Parish, Louisiana. The study used existing data and
methodology for independent contributions that the wetlands provided to ascertain a
value of Terrebonne Parish wetlands as a whole. One of the methods used to obtain the
value was asking individuals if they were willing to pay to retain the opportunity to use
the wetlands for recreation.
Constanza, Farber, and Maxwell (1989) also used willingness to pay estimates for
recreational use as part of a calculation of the value of wetland ecosystems in Louisiana.
This study used the willingness to pay estimates for recreational use found in Farber and
Costanza (1987). The total value of the wetland ecosystem was comprised of the
willingness to pay estimates for recreational use, the value of commercial fisheries, the
value of fur trapping in the wetlands, and the value from storm protection provided by
wetlands. Also, this study states that the total present value of wetlands is greatly affected
by the discount rate assumed.
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Bergstrom et al. (1990) sought to determine the economic value of wetlandsbased recreation in Louisiana. This study implored the contingent valuation method to
determine the value of recreational benefits of wetlands in Louisiana. The recreational
wetland benefits being valued included waterfowl hunting, saltwater fishing, freshwater
fishing, recreational crabbing, and recreational shrimping.
Whitehead (1990) utilized the contingent valuation method to determine the
willingness to pay of households in Kentucky to preserve hardwood forest wetlands
threatened by surface coal mining in Kentucky. Through the survey, respondents
indicated how much they were willing to pay to preserve the Clear Creek wetland area.
The willingness to pay estimate in this study included the use and non-use value that the
households in Kentucky placed on the wetland area. This study also found that older
respondents were less willing to pay to preserve the wetlands.
The purpose of Farber (1996) was to estimate the welfare loss that would be
incurred due to projected disintegration of Louisiana’s coastal wetlands. The study was
interested in determining if the benefits from stopping the disintegration would outweigh
the cost of projects that would stop the disintegration. The benefits of these projects were
estimated using welfare measures from decreases in the quality of commercial fisheries,
losses in value of recreational fishing experiences, losses in the value of property subject
to increased storm risk, the costs associated with storm protection, and increased cost to
maintain water quality if the projected disintegration was not prevented. To obtain the
value of lost recreational fishing experiences, this study used willingness to pay estimates
for retaining the quality of recreational activities in the coastal zone from wetland users.
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The willingness to pay estimates from a contingent valuation study was part of the total
value of preventing disintegration of Louisiana’s wetlands that was estimated.
Milon and Scrogin (2006) used survey data to estimate the value that Florida
residents placed on the restoration of the Greater Everglades ecosystem in Florida. The
study also found that structural and functional differences of the restoration plans affected
respondents’ willingness to pay and their preferences between the different types of
plans.
Petrolia and Kim (2009) estimated Mississippi residents’ willingness to pay to
restore the state’s barrier islands. This study used survey data from a random sample of
Mississippi households to determine preferences for three different restoration options
that provide different levels of land being restored to the state’s barrier islands. This
study found that there was support for such projects and that perceived protection from
hurricanes provided by the islands was the primary reasons for respondent’s willingness
to support one of the options.
Brander, Florax, and Vermaat (2006) is a comprehensive summary and a metanalysis of the wetland valuation literature. The analysis is very diverse in terms of the
wetlands and the benefits of wetlands that were valued and the valuation methods that
were used to obtain the value estimates. The different valuation methods included market
prices, replacement costs, opportunity costs, production functions, net factor income,
travel cost method, hedonic pricing, and the contingent valuation method. In this study
the contingent valuation method was found to yield higher values estimates than the other
valuation methods.
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Random Utility Model
This thesis utilizes the contingent valuation method for estimating welfare
measures for the prevention of future wetland loss. Data were collected through a survey.
One theoretical model that allows for the analysis of a contingent valuation study is the
random utility model. The following discussion is based on Haab and McConnell (2002).
The random utility model is the fundamental model for analyzing contingent valuation
responses. McFadden (1974) laid the groundwork for random utility, which Hanemann
(1984) utilized to develop the basic random utility model. Hanemann established the
framework that allows for the parameters of responses to dichotomous choice contingent
valuation questions to be estimated and interpreted.
In the basic referenda-style contingent valuation scenario the respondent has two
choices. The indirect utility for respondent j can then be written
u ij

u i ( y j , z j , H ij ) ,

1

where y j is the jth respondent’s income, z j is an m-dimensional vector of household
characteristics and choice attributes, and H ij is a component of preferences known by the
individual, but not known by the researcher, If respondent j answers yes to a required
payment of tj, then the utility with the proposed change, minus tj, exceeds the utility of
status quo
u1 j ( y j  t j , z j , H 1 j ) ! u 0 j ( y j , z j , H 0 j ) ,

2

where i =1 is the state that prevails when the proposed change is implemented, and i = 0
is for the status quo. Due to the fact that the researcher does not know the random part of
preferences, only a probability statement about the choice can be made. The probability
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of a “Yes” response is the probability that the respondent believes that he is better off
with the proposed change and the required payment. This means that u1 > u0, and
respondent j’s probability is
Pr( yes j )

Pr(u1 j ( y j  t j , z j , H 1 j ) ! u 0 j ( y j , z j , H 0 j )) .

3

This form is too general to allow for parametric testing, so two decisions must be made
that will allow for such testing. First the functional form of utility must be chosen.
Secondly, the distribution of H ij must be specified. Most approaches specify that the
utility function is additively separable in deterministic and stochastic preferences.

u ij ( y j , z j , H ij )

vij ( y j , z j 0 )  H i j .

4

With this additive statement the probability of respondent j can then be written
Pr( yes j )

Pr[v1 j ( y j  t j , z j )  H 1 j ! v 0 j ( y j , z j )  H 0 j ] .

5

Because the random components between the proposed change and status quo cannot be
identified there is no reason not to write the random term as H j { H 1 j  H 0 j , a single
random term. Now let FH (a) be the probability that the random variable H is less then a.
So the probability is
Pr( yes j ) 1  FH [ (v1 j ( y j  t j , z j )  v 0 j ( y j , z j ))] .

6

Now a more specific utility function is used to estimate the parameters. For this thesis,
several functional forms were tested. The linear utility function results when the
deterministic part of the preference function is linear in income and covariates

vi j ( y j ) D i z j  E i y j

7
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where income is yj, the m-dimensional vector of variables related to individual j is zj and a
m

m-dimensional vector of parameters is D i , so that D i z j

¦D

ik

z jk . The deterministic

k 1

utility for the proposed change scenario is

v1 j ( y j  t j ) D 1 z j  E1 ( y j  t j )

8

where tj is the price offered to the jth respondent. The status quo utility is

v0 j ( y j ) D 0 z j  E 0 y j .

9

The change in deterministic utility is

v1 j  v0 j

(D 1  D 0 ) z j  E1 ( y j  t j )  E 0 y j .

10

If it is assumed that the marginal utility of income is constant between the two options,
(e.g., if the bids are small relative to income), proposed change and status quo, this
implies that, E 0

E1 and the utility difference becomes
v1 j  v0 j

Dz j  Et j

11

m

where D

D 1  D 0 and Dz j

¦D

k

z jk . With the deterministic part of preferences

k 1

specified, the probability of responding “Yes” becomes
Pr( yes j )

Pr[Dz j  E t j  H j ! 0]

12

where H j { H 1 j  H 0 j as defined previously.

Random Willingness to Pay Model
A similar model to the random utility model that is used to analyze contingent
valuation studies is the random willingness to pay model. This model was developed by
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Cameron and James (1987) and Cameron (1988). The discussion that follows comes from
Haab and McConnell (2002). This technique models the willingness to pay function
directly for the contingent valuation question instead of using the indirect utility function
that is used in the random utility model. There are reasons for the use of random
willingness to pay instead of random utility model. One is the willingness to pay function
is more transparent than the utility difference function, which can lead to more plausible
distributions. Also, some simple utility differences could imply unacceptable
distributions on the willingness to pay estimate.
The willingness to pay for the contingent valuation scenario comparative to the
status quo is defined as
v1 ( y i  WTP ( y i , z i , H i ), z i )  H 1i

v0 ( yi , z i )  H 0i

13

where v is the indirect utility of respondent, yi is the respondent’s income, ti is the cost of
the program and zi is a vector of household characteristics, İi is a component of random
preferences. The respondent will answer yes when WTP exceeds tj:
WTP ( y i , z i , H i ) ! t i ,

14

and it is true when

Q 1 ( yi  t i , z i )  H 1i ! Q 0 ( y i , z i )  H 0i

15

This also can be shown as equivalent probability statements:
Pr[WTP ( y i , z i , H i ) ! t i ]

Pr[Q 1 ( y i  t i , z i )  H 1i ) ! Q 0 ( y i , z i )  H 0i )] .

16

This indicates that the probability of receiving a “Yes” response is
Pr( yesi )

Pr(WTP ! t i ) .
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CHAPTER IV
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

This chapter encompasses discussions of the factors that were considered in
modeling the respondent’s willingness to fund the prevention of wetland loss and how
they would affect their decision. This chapter also includes a description of the survey
methods and responses to questions related to the factors believed to affect respondent
choice.

The Market Scenario
At the beginning of the survey respondents were given a brief introduction of
wetland loss in Louisiana. The introduction stated, “Coastal Louisiana has lost an average
of 34 square miles of land, primarily marsh, per year for the last 50 years. From 1932 to
200 coastal Louisiana lost 1,900 square miles of land, roughly an area the size of the state
of Delaware.” A map was also provided that illustrated the land loss from1932-2000,
predicted land loss from 2000-2050, land gain 1932-2050, and predicted land gain from
2000-2050. Also, they were told, “Hurricanes Katrina and Rita eroded an additional 217
square miles in 2005 alone.” Also, “if no action is taken, Louisiana could potentially lose
an additional 700 square miles of land, about equal to the size of the greater Washington
D.C. – Baltimore area, by the year 2050.”
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They were provided time frames for the implementation of the two proposals and
for how long the land will be maintained once the proposal is completed. The short run
proposal would take 5 years to implement and the land loss would be prevented until the
year 2050, and in the long run proposal implementation would take 25 years and the
wetland loss would be prevented until year 2185. Each respondent was presented with
the same price for both proposals.

Elicitation Method
The elicitation method utilized was referendum style. After the proposals were
presented the respondent had to decide whether to support the short run proposal or the
long run proposal at the bid value once every year for ten years or to vote for no action
being taken. The “Yes” or “No” response for willingness to fund one of the proposals
provides a WTP/WTA value. Also, depending on the version the question was either
asked in the WTP or WTA format. The WTP format asks respondents if they would be
willing to pay a tax once a year for ten years to prevent future wetland loss. While the
WTA format asks the respondents if they would be willing not to receive a tax refund
once a year for ten years.
There were 20 versions of the survey because of the 10 different bid values for the
proposals, half being WTP and half being WTA, and half having the long run proposal
presented first and half having the short run proposal presented first. Table 1 shows bid
value, WTP or WTA format, and order of the long run and short run proposals for each
version. The respondents were asked to evaluate two separate proposals that will prevent
future wetland losses.
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Table 1
Survey Versions

Order

Bids

Version

#1
#2
#3
#4
#5
#6
#7
#8
#9
#10

WTP/
WTA
WTP
WTP
WTP
WTP
WTP
WTP
WTP
WTP
WTP
WTP

SR-LR
SR-LR
SR-LR
SR-LR
SR-LR
SR-LR
SR-LR
SR-LR
SR-LR
SR-LR

$50
$71
$101
$144
$204
$291
$413
$588
$836
$1,189

#11
#12
#13
#14
#15
#16
#17
#18
#19
#20

WTP
WTP
WTP
WTP
WTP
WTP
WTP
WTP
WTP
WTP

LR-SR
LR-SR
LR-SR
LR-SR
LR-SR
LR-SR
LR-SR
LR-SR
LR-SR
LR-SR

$50
$71
$101
$144
$204
$291
$413
$588
$836
$1,189

Version

Order

Bids

#21
#22
#23
#24
#25
#26
#27
#28
#29
#30

WTP/
WTA
WTA
WTA
WTA
WTA
WTA
WTA
WTA
WTA
WTA
WTA

SR-LR
SR-LR
SR-LR
SR-LR
SR-LR
SR-LR
SR-LR
SR-LR
SR-LR
SR-LR

$50
$71
$101
$144
$204
$291
$413
$588
$836
$1,189

#31
#32
#33
#34
#35
#36
#37
#38
#39
#40

WTA
WTA
WTA
WTA
WTA
WTA
WTA
WTA
WTA
WTA

LR-SR
LR-SR
LR-SR
LR-SR
LR-SR
LR-SR
LR-SR
LR-SR
LR-SR
LR-SR

$50
$71
$101
$144
$204
$291
$413
$588
$836
$1,189

Market Administration and Sample Design
The NOAA Panel recommends in-person interviews method for administering
surveys, but due to finical constraints mail surveys were used to obtain the data for the
this thesis. The survey was mailed to a random sample (stratified by population) of 3,000
households in Louisiana in May, 2009, and follow up survey was mailed in June, 2009.
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Survey Design
This study aims to determine whether individuals are willing to support a short or
long run proposal to prevent future wetland loss. The alternative to these two proposals is
for the respondent to prefer no action being taken. It also allows us to determine what
factors influence an individual to prefer one of the two proposals. These factors are
discussed in this section.
The independent variables that are included in the analysis are as follows: income,
bid (price of the proposal), climate change perceptions, risk preferences and perceptions,
time preference of money, proximity of home to the coast, hurricane expectations,
perceived benefits, age, gender, race, and education. Many of these variables are found in
almost all contingent valuation analyses.

Income and Bid
Income and bid are needed in the model because the model is determining if and
how much an individual is willing to pay to receive a good or the benefits from a good,
and economic theory dictates that price and income should influence the decision.
Income needs to be in this type of contingent valuation model because it is a hypothetical
model and not based on a real transaction where a budget constraint can affect
willingness to make a transaction. Income provides a measure of the budget constraint on
the respondent’s decision. Bid has to be in the model because of the law of demand. As
the price for the proposals increases the probability of support should decrease.

33

Climate Change Perceptions
One of the aspects of this thesis is determining how climate change perceptions
affect willingness to pay for projects that will prevent future wetland loss in Louisiana.
There has been a substantial amount of work done on how people’s perceptions of
climate change affect their willingness to pay for climate change mitigation, but there has
not been an extensive amount of work done concerning how perceptions of climate
change affect individuals’ willingness to pay for a specific environmental project that can
be affected by climate change.
Cameron (2005) evaluated willingness to pay for climate change mitigation.
Cameron (2005) found that people’s willingness to pay for climate change mitigation was
dependent upon their perceptions of climate change. It was found that if people perceived
climate change to be damaging in the future they were more willing to pay to mitigate
climate change. Yet, uncertainty about the effects of climate change caused individuals to
be less willing to support policies.
We hypothesize that if people have the perception that climate change affects sea
level rise and that sea level rise is a threat to respondents, then their willingness to pay for
programs that will protect current wetlands and build future wetlands will be affected.
There were four questions asked in the survey to obtain the respondents’ perceptions
about climate change.

Time Preference
Due to the fact that individuals are comparing proposals that provide benefits over
different periods of time it is hypothesized that respondent’s time preference for money
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will have an effect of their decision as well. The example that follows is similar to the
decision that individuals taking the survey had to make. In this example, individuals have
the option to support one of three proposals. Figure 5 below is a representation of the
levels of land per year that are provided under each of the three options using the actual
acreage predictions. The analysis assumes linear land loss and equal rate of land loss
across the three options. This assumption was made because the beginning and end points
of land were known, but there was no data to suggest that the rate would not be constant
so a linear land loss was assumed.
4700
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Figure 5 Land per Year for the Three Proposals

The individual would choose between one of the three proposals and the proposal
chosen would be enacted today. The “No-action” proposal provides no action to mitigate
35

loss of land and the amount of land loss continues as forecasted. It was assumed that both
the short run and long run proposal lose land at the same rate as no action until the point
where the proposal is implemented. The “SR” proposal represented in the figure
illustrates a short run option that if selected takes until year 2015 to implement fully, and
land loss occurs at the same rate as the “no action” until implementation. After
implementation in 2010 the short run proposal restores acreage to initial levels, 4700
square miles (sq ml) of land, until 2050 and then land levels begin to decrease again at
the same rate. The “LR” proposal is a long run option that would take until year 2035 to
implement, with land levels decreasing at the same rate as under “no-action” until
implementation. Upon completion in 2035 the proposal would restore initial levels of
land until 2185, and after 2185 land levels would begin to decrease at the initial rate. To
isolate the time preference and because there was no information to indicate otherwise it
was assumed costs were identical for the short and long run proposals.
Figure 5 allows us to make a visual comparison between the three proposals.
Assuming that land is the numeriare good, which means the PL = 1, then an acre of land is
interpreted as a suite of benefits undiscounted, such that all else equal, more land is
preferred to less land. It is clear to see that no action provides fewer aggregate land
benefits over time than either the short or long run proposals from the areas under the
curves. When the short and long run proposals are compared over the same time period it
can be seen that the long run proposal provides more aggregate land than the short run
proposal. This implies that, undiscounted, the long run proposal should have a higher
value associated with it than the short run proposal and the short run proposal should
have a higher value than no action.
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Yet, through the decisions that individuals make an inference can be made about
the individual’s actual value of the proposals and in turn the value of having the different
levels of land (at different times) under the proposals. If an individual chooses no action
over either of the other proposals, then it was assumed that the cost of implementation
incurred is higher than the value that they place on the increase in aggregate land under
either of the proposals. If the individual chooses the short run proposal or long run
proposal, then their value of the increase in the land is higher than the cost associated
with implementation. Because prices for the short run and long run proposals were
assumed to be the same, yet the long run proposal provides more aggregate land over
time it would be expected that, strictly on the value of the land, an individual willing to
support some form of action being taken would always choose the long run proposal. Yet,
if individuals do choose the short run over the long run, then it would mean that factors
other than maximizing the quantity of land over time is driving their decision to choose
the short run proposal over the long run proposal.
In the decision making scenarios just discussed, it could be said that an individual
is discounting the value of the land per year in the proposals, and that this discounting of
proposals may be the cause of an individual choosing the short run proposal.
Reinterpreting Figure 5 as values, it is assumed that if an individual chooses the short run
proposal over the long run proposal, then the benefits from that proposal exceed that of
the long run proposal. Because the only difference between the two proposals is timing, it
is assumed that the difference is due to discounting. This discounting could be caused by
the time preference of money, desiring land now as compared to later due to age,
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assumption of lower probability of receiving the benefits in the distant future, risk
perception, risk preference, perceived benefits and perception of climate change.
Figure 6 illustrates such a situation where the proposals have been discounted so
that the aggregate benefits are the same for the short run and long run proposals. The
proposals in Figure 5 were made equal by applying a discount rate. The applied discount
rate was found by weighting each unit of land at time period t, Lt, by the discount a factor
1
x Lt then solving for the value of r that yields
(1  r ) t

³

SR

fL dt
t

LR
t

³ fL

dt . Because there

was actual forecasted acreage, the actual value of r* could be calculated. This yields the
implied discount rate r* = 0.038115 such that anybody choosing the short run proposal
must have a discount rate greater than, or equal to r*.
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There could be many factors that could cause an individual to discount the
proposals in such a way that a proposal that actually provides less aggregate benefits
could be chosen over a proposal that provides more aggregate benefits. The factors that
could affect discounting were discussed earlier and questions are asked on the survey that
provides data to test if they have an affect on the respondent’s decision making process.

Risk
Since the decision in question can have implications for improving an individual’s
safety it is hypothesized that an individual’s risk perception and risk preference will have
an affect on the decision between the three proposals. The conclusions of Lusk and Coble
(2005) imply that both risk preferences and risk perceptions could affect the public’s
willingness to pay for the prevention of future wetland loss projects. The question is how
individuals perceive a risk from the loss of wetlands and if those perceptions affect their
willingness to pay for these projects. Information that will allow this hypothesis about
risk perception and preferences to be tested was obtained through the survey.
One way of obtaining risk perceptions is to obtain information on the
respondents’ expectations of how often a category 3 or greater hurricane will affect them.
These hurricane expectations are hypothesized to affect a respondent’s decision because
one proposed benefit of wetland loss prevention is believed to be reduced risk from
hurricanes. Risk preferences were obtained through a question asking if respondents
would make a gamble. This question will determine respondents’ risk preferences and it
is hypothesized that their risk preferences will affect their decisions.
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Perceived Benefits
Petrolia and Kim (2009) found that the perceived benefits had an affect on a
respondent’s willingness to pay for restoration of barrier islands. Due to this it is
hypothesized that the benefit that respondents believe they will obtain from the
prevention of wetland loss affects their decision in the choice model in this thesis as well.
The question that provides this data is discussed in the next chapter.

Proximity to the Coast
The variable for proximity from the coast is hypothesized to affect a respondent’s
decision because if an individual lives closer to the coast the benefits of the actions can
have more of an impact than it would upon someone who does not live in close proximity
to the coast. This was obtained in the survey by asking respondents where they live and
their residence information to develop a proxy measurement for distance from the coast.

Payment Mechanism
The survey also elicits the respondent’s willingness to support the prevention of
future wetland loss by splitting the survey versions in half based on the payment
mechanism used to test for the difference between the willingness to pay and willingness
to accept. Thus, this thesis investigates whether the framing of the question as WTP or
WTA has any effect on the value that people place on the prevention of future wetland
loss.
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Question Order
The order in which the long run and short run were presented in the survey was
different between the two versions of the survey. Half of the surveys had the long run
proposal presented first and then the short run. The order was reversed for the other half.
This treatment will also be tested if it had an effect on the decision between the
proposals.

Survey Results
This section discusses the survey results, the questions that were asked, and the
data that were provided to test the previously stated hypotheses.
A total of six-hundred eighty surveys were returned. Of those returned fivehundred one came from the first mailing and one-hundred seventy-nine came from the
second mailing, and making up 73.72% and 26.28%, respectively, of the total. The
overall response rate was 22.7%.
Table 2 shows a comparison of the sample and the population demographics.
Population data is from the 2006-2008 American Community Survey estimates (USCB
2010). The sample is older, whiter, more male, more educated, and wealthier than the
population. Twenty four percent of the sample is over the age of 65 where as the
percentage of the population over 65 is just 12.60%.The sample is 81% and the
population is 64% white. The sample is 60.47% male while the population is 49.30%
male. Also, 55.38% of the sample holds an associates degree or higher, whereas only
25% of the population had achieved an associates degree or higher. Additionally, the
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sample’s median income is $16,382 higher than the population median income of
$58,911.

Table 2
Comparison of Sample and Population Demographics
Proportions (N = 511)

Household size
Age: 65 or over
Education H.S. diploma
Associates or Bachelor's degree
Graduate or Professional degree
Income
Gender
Males
Race
White
*Population data from ACS 06-08 estimates

Sample Population*
2.51
2.63
23.87%
12.60%
41.49%
35.30%
37.18%
18.40%
18.20%
6.70%
$75,293
$58,911
60.47%
49.30%
81.02%
64.30%

Kruskal-Wallis and two-sample tests of probability were used to determine if
there was a significant difference in demographics across the two previously stated
survey treatment groups, WTP/WTA and question order of long and short run proposals.
No significance was found across treatment samples except for difference in education
and years lived in their stated zip code under the WTP/WTA treatment. The education
variable was significant at the 5% probability level (p = 0.0434; means for each treatment
are 1.77 for WTP and 1.65 for WTA). The variable for how many years the respondent
has lived in this zip code was significant at the 5% probability level (p = .0152; the mean
number of years for WTP treatment = 22.23 and for WTA treatment = 22.94). Although
statistically significant, these differences are not considered to be a cause for concern.
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Accordingly, this research was carried out under the assumption that the treatment
samples are not biased to the extent of being a serious concern.
Table 3 illustrates the respondents’ preferences between the long run proposal,
short run proposal, and no action being taken. Of the 511 responses 79.06% preferred
some action being taken to prevent future wetland loss, while only 20.94% responded
that they preferred no action to be taken.

Table 3
Preference Between Long/Short/No Action
Variables
Short run
Long run
No action
Total responses

Frequency
370
34
107
511

Percent
72.41%
6.65%
20.94%

Table 4 shows the number of votes that each proposal received under the ten
different bids. The table also separates the WTP from the WTA votes.
Respondents were asked a question to determine what benefits were important to
them when they were making their decision.
“Regardless of how you voted in the previous questions, what potential benefit
was of greatest importance when making your decisions?”
Table 5 shows the different options the respondents were given and the number of votes
each one received. The potential benefits that were of the most importance to the
respondents were storm protection and protection of the environment/ecosystem, which
made up 55.19% and 19.96% of the responses respectively. The next potential benefit
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that respondents had in mind was actually no potential benefit in mind, and made up
13.11% of the responses to this question.

Table 4
Frequency of "Yes" Responses for Willingness to Pay Responses
and Willingness to Accept at Different Bids

Short
run
Long
run
No
action
Total

Short
run
Long
run
No
action
Total

Willingness to Pay
$50 $71 $101 $144 $204 $291 $413 $588 $836 $1,189 Total
20 20
13
22
11
16
16
10
15
7
150
1

1

2

3

4

2

1

0

0

4

18

7

8

7

11

2

9

6

6

12

9

77

28

29

22

36

2

2

1

0

1

0

3

3

1

3

16

3

3

1

3

2

4

1

4

3

6

30

29

23

25

24

21

32

23

22

29
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266

17
27
23
16
27
20
245
Willingness to Accept
$50 $71 $101 $144 $204 $291 $413 $588 $836 $1,189 Total
24 18
23
21
18
28
19
15
25
29
220

Table 5
Potential Benefits of Greatest Importance
Potential benefits
Storm protection
Protection of recreational opportunities
Protection against sea-level rise due to climate change
Protection of the environment/ecosystem
Protection of commercial fisheries
Other
No potential benefits in mind
Total
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Frequency Percentage
282
55.19%
16
3.13%
25
4.89%
102
19.96%
8
1.57%
11
2.15%
67
13.11%
511

The following four questions obtained data on the respondent’s perceptions of
climate change and its effects on the respondent’s decision between the three proposals.
Table 6 shows the results for the question:
“Scientists believe that climate change is occurring and that it may have
significant potential consequences, such as increased temperatures leading to sea-level
rise. How strongly do you believe that climate change should be taken seriously?”
It can be seen from this table 77.1% of respondents believe that climate change should be
taken seriously.
Table 6
Belief in Climate Change

Very strongly
Somewhat strongly
Not at all
I don't know
Totals

Frequency
222
172
80
37
511

Percentage
43.44%
33.66%
15.66%
7.24%

The following question was asked to obtain the respondents expectations about
how often hurricanes such as Katrina and Rita will make landfall in Louisiana.
“How often do you expect a Category 3 hurricane (wind speeds of 111 – 130 mph
and a storm surge of 9-12 feet) or greater to pass within 80 miles of your home? (As
examples, Hurricane Katrina and Rita made landfall as Category 3 hurricanes in
2005.)”
Table 7 shows the responses to this question. Seventy four percent of respondents believe
that a Category 3 hurricane would affect them somewhere in between once a year and
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once every 10 years. Most of the respondents perceived frequency to be higher than the
actual frequency which is approximately once in every 37.5 years (NHC, 2010). Through
this hurricane expectation a measure of risk perception is obtained.

Table 7
Category 3 Hurricanes Expectation

Once a year or more
Once every 2-5 years
Once every 10 years
Once every 20 years
Once every 30 years
Once every 50 years
Once every 100 years or more
I don’t know
Total

Frequency
69
204
105
29
9
7
24
64
511

Percentage
13.50%
39.92%
20.55%
5.68%
1.76%
1.37%
4.70%
12.52%

Table 8 shows the responses to the following question.
“Suppose you won $50, and had the opportunity to either walk away or gamble to
win more money (or lose some). Please read each choice very carefully and choose what
you would do.”
The question provides data needed to test the hypothesis that risk preferences affect an
individual’s decision between proposals. It can be seen that 31.51% were willing to make
gamble of some kind.
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Table 8
Gamble/Risk Preference

Walk away with $50
Gamble the $50 equal chance $70/$30
Gamble the $50 equal chance $90/$10
Total

Frequency
350
105
56
511

Percentage
68.49%
20.55%
10.96%

The following question was asked to provide data on how confident they are that
the government will be able to carry out the type of proposals outlined in the survey.
“In general, how much confidence do you have in the ability of government
agencies to carry out coastal restoration efforts efficiently and in a timely manner?”
Table 9 shows the results to this question. It can be seen the almost half of the
respondents stated having no confidence in government to carry out these proposals.

Table 9
Confidence in Government to
Accomplish Restoration

Very confident
Somewhat confident
Not at all confident
I don't know
Total

Frequency
32
214
233
32
511

Percentage
6.26%
41.88%
45.60%
6.26%

The following question was asked to determine if individuals thought that there
responses to the survey would actually have any effect on what actions were taken.
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“Do you think that your votes on the proposals presented here will have any
influence on the actual actions taken by the State of Louisiana?”
Table 10 shows the responses to this question. Almost half of the respondents indicated
that they do not believe their responses to this survey would affect policy decisions.

Table 10
Belief that Response Will Influence Actual
Actions by the State of Louisiana

Yes
No
I don’t know
Total

Frequency
96
239
176
511

Percentage
18.79%
46.77%
34.44%

Table 11 shows the responses to the question:
“Since 1990, the State of Louisiana has been working to restore and to manage
coastal wetlands in order to prevent future land losses. Prior to this survey, were you
aware of these efforts taking place in Louisiana?”
This question provides insight into the knowledge that individuals had prior to the survey
and allow for testing to see if this knowledge affects their choice. The majority of the
population was of aware of previous restoration efforts.

Table 11
Aware of Restoration Efforts

Yes
No
Total

Frequency
402
109
511
48

Percentage
78.67%
21.33%

CHAPTER V
ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATION

This chapter describes the multinomial logit model used to estimate the model.
This chapter also discusses hypothesis tests that were performed on the model.
Multinomial Logit Model
The multinomial logit model was used given the trichotomous unordered discrete
dependent variable. The following discussion of the multinomial logit model is based
upon Greene (2000). The model below, (18), is a multinomial logit using the model
specification shown in equation (34). The model specification being shown in this
example allows for a bounded income model. The reason why this specification was used
will be discussed in the next section.

Prob(Y

j)

§ y t·
exp[(z i Ȗ  ln¨ i
¸) / V ]
© t ¹
,j
J
§ yi  t ·
1  ¦ exp[(z i Ȗ  ln¨
¸) / V ]
© t ¹
k 1

0,1,..., J

18

In this equation zi is a dimensional vector of characteristics, Ȗ is a dimensional vector of
parameters, ı is the unknown standard error, yi is the individual’s income, and t is the bid.
The estimated equations provide a set of probabilities for the J +1 choices for a decision
maker i with characteristics zi. Any indeterminacies in the model must be removed. If
any vector of q is defined as Ȗj* = Ȗj + q, then the identical set of probabilities result
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because the terms involving q all drop out. A normalization that solves this problem is to
assume that Ȗ0 = 0. The probabilities become

Prob(Y

j)

Prob(Y

0)

§ y t·
exp[(z i Ȗ  ln¨ i
¸) / V ]
© t ¹
,j
J
§ yi  t ·
1  ¦ exp[(z i Ȗ  ln¨
¸) / V ]
© t ¹
k 1

1
J

§ y t ·
1  ¦ exp[(z i Ȗ  ln¨ i
¸) / V ]
© t ¹
k 1

1,...., J ,

.
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The model implies that the J log-odds can be computed

ª Pij º
ln « »
¬ Pi 0 ¼

z' j Ȗ i .

21

This could normalized on any other probability and obtain

ª Pij º
ln « »
¬ Pik ¼

Ȗ 'i (z j  z k ) .
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The multinomial model estimation is as follows. The log-likelihood can be derived by
defining, for each individual, dij = 1 if alternative j is chosen by individual i, and 0 if not,
for the J + 1 possible outcomes. Then, for each i, only one of dij’s is 1. Also, wij is a
sample weight that is added to the model. The log-likelihood is a generalization of the
multinomial logit model:
ln L

n

j

i 1

j 0

¦¦

w j d ij ln Prob(Yi

j) .
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By differentiating (1), the marginal effects of the characteristics on the probabilities are

Gj

wPj
wz i

J

Pj [ Ȗ j  ¦ Pk Ȗ k ]
k 0
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Pj [ Ȗ j  Ȗ ] .
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Due to this, every subvector of Ȗ enters every marginal effect, through the probabilities
and through the weighted average that appears in įj. These values are computed with the
parameter estimates. Although the usual focus is on coefficient estimates, equation (24)
suggests that there is at least some potential for confusion. Note, for example, that for any
particular xk, Pj/zk need not have the same sign as Ȗjk.
In Stata the errors are estimated using the delta method. The delta method
described here is presented in the Stata Manual (2009). The maximum-likelihood
function can be written

G(Ȗ )

n

¦ S ( Ȗ; y

j

,z j )

0
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j 1

Where S( Ȗ; y j , z j )

w ln L j / wȖ is the score and lnLj is the log likelihood for the jth

observation. The using the delta method the variance of G (Ȗ ) can be written as
Vˆ{G ( Ȗ )} Ȗ

Ȗˆ

wG ( Ȗ )
wȖ

Ȗ Ȗˆ

wG ( Ȗ )
Vˆ ( Ȗˆ )
wȖ '

.
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Ȗ Ȗˆ

Solving for Vˆ ( Ȗˆ ) yields

Vˆ ( Ȗˆ )

1
ª wG ( Ȗ ) ½ 1
 wG ( Ȗ ) ½ º
ˆ
«®
¾ V {G ( Ȗ )}®
¾ »
«¬¯ wȖ ¿
¯ wȖ ' ¿ »¼

Ȗ Ȗˆ
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Since the Hessian (matrix of the second derivates) of the log likelihood is
H

wG ( Ȗ )
,
wȖ

28

Vˆ ( Ȗˆ ) can be written
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Vˆ ( Ȗˆ )

where D

DVˆ ^G ( Ȗ )` Ȗ Ȗˆ D
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 H 1 is the traditional covariance estimate.

G (Ȗ ) is simply a sum, and the variance can be estimated the same as it would for

the sum of any other variable. Here the scores u j

S ( Ȗ; y j , z j ) are row vectors. Their

sum is zero, meaning that their mean is also zero. This yields

Vˆ{G ( Ȗ )} Ȗ

Ȗˆ

n n
¦ u' j u j .
n 1 j 1
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The robust variance estimator is

Vˆ ( Ȗˆ )

§ n n
·
D¨¨
u' j u j ¸¸D .
¦
© n 1 j 1
¹
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Income and Bid Specification
There are multiple options for the modeling of income and bid in a contingent
valuation model. The way it was shown earlier in the random utility model discussion
assumed a constant marginal utility of income. In a model where linear marginal utility of
income is assumed, willingness to pay is not actually a function of income but only bid.
The raw results indicated that there was not a point where the number of responses in
support of the short run or the long run proposals began to decrease as bid increases.
This is contrary to economic theory where as the cost (here the bid) of the good increases
then the willingness to purchase the good should decrease (the votes for support). Due to
this, a model is needed that also takes income into account. The log-linear utility of
income models and Box-Cox models allow income and bid to be accounted for in the
model. These models do not restrict the marginal utility of income to be constant.
52

Another type of log-linear model is a bounded log-linear income model. The use
of bounded log-linear income variables is supported by Haab and McConnell (1998)
when the upper bound on willingness to pay estimates exceeds income, which was the
case when income was not bounded in this model. This method is also recommended
because it does not use an arbitrary truncation and allows for consistency between
estimation parameters and calculation of WTP. The model being bounded by income
forces the upper bound to be equal to income. The random willingness to pay model
allows for this type of income variable to be implemented. Haab and McConnell (2002)
show a direct way of deriving a model that bounds willingness to pay by income:
WTPj

G (z j Ȗ  H j ) y j
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Where 0 d G ( z j J  H j ) d 1 and G ' ( z j Ȗ  H j ) t 0 . The function G ( z j Ȗ  H j ) is
willingness to pay as a proportion of income. A tractable version of this model is
WTPj

yj
1  exp( z j Ȗ  H )

.
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The mathematical equations of the probability of a yes response using the random
willingness to pay model is
Pr( yesi ) 1  FWTP (t )

1
§ y t ·
1  exp[(z i Ȗ  ln¨ i
¸) / V ]
© t ¹

.

§ y t·
The variable ln¨ i
¸ was generated to provide the bounded income variable in the
© t ¹
multinomial logit model.
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Econometric Model Specification
As previously stated this thesis uses a multinomial logit model to measure the
effect of factors on the individual decision between one of three proposals. This section
discusses which variables are in the final multinomial logit model that is estimated. Also,
the specification of the factors of theoretical and primary concern, mentioned in Chapter
IV, is discussed here. This section also discusses which survey questions are used to
represent these factors in the model and how the variables are specified. Table 12 provide
the descriptions and means of the independent variables that are in the model.
The demographic variables that are used in this model are gender, race, age,
household size, and education. To obtain a variable that accounted for the respondent’s
proximity to the coast the zip code they provided was used to identify a corresponding
latitude value that was obtained from 2000 Census gazetteer files for counties (USCB,
2010).
Multiple questions were asked in the survey to determine the respondent’s
perception of climate change. All of the questions were highly correlated with one
another. The question that was used to generate the variable in the model was discussed
in Chapter IV. This question was chosen out of the four correlated questions to represent
respondent’s climate change perceptions because it was believed to be the most
representative of the respondent’s climate change perceptions.
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Table 12
Multinomial Logit Model Variables and Descriptions
Variables
Income-Bid

Type
Ordered
Categorical

Description
ª( y j  t j )º
ln «
»
«¬ t j
»¼

Mean
5.15

Gender

Binary

1 if male; 0 if female

0.56

Race

Binary

1 if white; 0 otherwise

0.76

Age

Continuous Continuous between 19 - 84

54.31

Household

Ordered
Household size 1 if # is 1; 2
Categorical if # is 2; 3 if #; 4 if # is 4; 5
if # is 5 or greater

2.46

Education

Ordered
Highest level of education 1
Categorical if some school or high
school; 2 if associates or
bachelors; 3 if masters,
professional, or doctoral

1.64

Latitude

Continuous Latitude based upon zip code
of respondent

30.69

StormBenefit

Binary

1 if storm protection was
most important benefit, 0 if
otherwise

0.54

EnivronmentBenefit

Binary

1 if environment protection
was most important benefit,
0 if otherwise

0.18

CCBenefit

Binary

1 if protection against sealevel rise due to climate
change was most important
benefit, 0 if otherwise

0.06
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Table 12 (Continued)
Variables

Type

Description

Mean

CCperception

Binary

1 if respondents do not at all
believe in climate change; 0
otherwise

0.13

PreKnowledge

Binary

1 if respondent had prior
knowledge of actions to protect
wetlands; 0 otherwise

0.76

Government

Binary

1 if no confidence that government
agency can accomplish such
actions; 0 otherwise

0.43

Influence

Binary

1 if respondents believe responses
will influence policy; 0 otherwise

0.20

RiskPref

Binary

1 if respondents does not take a
gamble; 0 otherwise

0.69

HurrFreqHI

Binary

1 if respondent believes a Category
3 hurricane will affect them
between 1 and 10 years; 0
otherwise

0.73

LongRunFirst

Binary

1 if long run proposal was
presented first; 0 if short sun was
presented first

0.51

WTP

Binary

1 if the payment mechanism was
willingness to pay; 0 if willingness
to accept

0.47

The survey also provided data that allowed for the calculation of discount rates
for the respondents. Due to the fact that the proposals presented in the survey span a
number of years it was hypothesized that respondents’ discount rates could have an effect
on the choice among the three options. The discount rate variable was found to be
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correlated with age. This correlation caused the age parameter to become insignificant
when the discount rate was included in the model. Due to this, the discount variable was
left out of the model, and the age variable was left in the model.
Risk preferences and risk perceptions were factors that were hypothesized to have
an effect on respondent’s decision between the three proposals. The risk preference
variable was taken from the gamble question on the survey. The category 3 hurricane
frequency question on the survey provided the variable for risk perceptions. The
responses were split into one of three categories by comparing response sets to actual
hurricane frequency. The high frequency group contained those respondents that
expected a category 3 hurricane to make landfall once every 1 - 10 years, the low
frequency group expected landfall once every 11 - 100 or more years, and the last group
were those that responded that they did not know the frequency. The actual frequency at
which a category 3 hurricane would affect the respondents is approximately once in every
37.5 years (NHC, 2010). The respondent’s hurricane frequency expectations are being
assumed to be a proxy of the respondents risk perceptions in this model.
Confidence in government is another factor that is in the model to determine if it
affects the respondent’s decision. One of the questions in the survey asked respondents if
they believed government would be able to accomplish the proposals presented in the
survey. This variable is determining if respondent’s lack of confidence in government
deters them from being willing to support these proposals.
Another factor that is tested in contingent valuation studies is the respondent’s
prior knowledge of the issue. Though information about the issue of coastal wetland loss
and the efforts to prevent it were outlined in the survey, it is important to determine if
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respondent’s prior knowledge of these issues has an effect on the respondent’s choice.
Carson, Flores and Meade (2001) discuss how prior knowledge of a good can affect
contingent valuation studies such as this one. In the survey there was a question that
asked individuals if they were familiar with the restoration efforts that had been taking
place in Coastal Louisiana. The responses to this question are being used to determine
how prior knowledge of the issue affects their decision.
A variable that is typically present in contingent valuation studies is an influence
or a consequence variable. The purpose of this type of variable is to determine if the
respondent believes that their responses will actually affect policy decisions. Kolstad
(2000) and Hanemann (1994) both discuss how this type of hypothetical bias can affect
contingent valuation studies and justification for the contingent valuation method. The
model includes a variable that reflects whether respondent’s decisions were affected by
their belief that their responses would or would not affect policies.
Two treatment variables are in the model as well. The order in which the
proposals were presented in the survey, either the long run proposal first and the short run
proposal second, or vice versa. Also, there is a variable that accounts for the payment
mechanism being willingness to pay (tax) or willingness to accept (tax refund).

Sample Weights
It was mentioned earlier that our sample is older, whiter, more male, more
educated, and wealthier than the population of interest. To mitigate this problem to some
extent, a probability weight was used to make the sample more representative of the
population. Using the income variable from the sample and population income data
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available through the 2006-2008 American Community Survey (USCB, 2010) probability
weights were generated that were used to weight the likelihood function. The weights
were generated by taking the probability of the sample that fell within a range of incomes
and equivalent probabilities for the population and then calculating a weight that made
the probabilities for the income ranges equal across the sample and population. The
probability weights that were used are shown in Table 13.

Table 13
Probability Weights
Income
Less than $14,999
$15,000 - $24,999
$25,000 - $34,999
$35,000 - $49,999
$50,000 - $74,999
$75,000 - $99,999
$100,000 - $149,999
$150,000 - more

Population
17.90%
12.70%
11.60%
14.30%
17.20%
10.80%
9.90%
5.40%

Sample
8.33%
10.20%
10.03%
14.80%
18.20%
14.12%
15.65%
8.67%

Weight
2.14886
1.245098
1.15653
0.966216
0.945055
0.764873
0.632588
0.622837

Table 14 shows the same demographics values for the sample and the population
that were covered in Table 2, as well as the weighted sample values for those
demographics. The sample’s household size, being over 65 years of age, and education
level of high school become less representative of the population when calculated using
the sample weight. However gender, race, income, associates or bachelor’s degree, and
graduate or professional degree all become more representative of the population. This
indicates that while the sample weight is not perfect, it does cause the sample to become
more representative of the population.
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Table 14
Comparison of Sample, Weighted Sample, and Population Demographics
Proportions (N = 511)

Household size
Age: 65 or over
Education H.S. diploma
Associates or Bachelor's degree
Graduate or Professional degree
Income
Gender
Males
Race
White
*Population data from ACS 06-08 estimates

Sample
2.51
23.87%
41.49%
37.18%
18.20%
$75,293
60.47%
81.02%

Weighted
Sample Population*
2.46
2.63
25.50%
12.60%
46.46%
35.30%
32.87%
18.40%
15.34%
6.70%
$60,429
$58,911
55.68%
49.30%
76.13%
64.30%

Hypothesis Testing
The following section discusses statistical tests that were conducted. The tests and
the estimation of the multinomial logit were performed in Stata 10.0 (2007). Since this is
a multinomial logit there are three sets of coefficients that are obtained. In this thesis the
three sets are short run vs. no action, long run vs. no action, and long vs. short run.

Test of Sub-Sample Model Equivalence
Tests of structural differences were performed if it was hypothesized that there
may be structural difference between sub-samples. Willingness to pay vs. willingness to
accept, confidence in government, and a latitude variable that split respondents between
coastal and non-coastal were variables that were believed to be potential source of
structural difference. These hypotheses were tested by splitting the sample according to
each of the sub-samples noted above, estimating the model separately for each sub60

sample, and performing an adjusted Wald test (equivalent to a Chow test) to determine if
there were statistically significant differences between the parameters estimated for each
of these sub-samples. Table 15 presents the probability associated with these tests. This
multinomial model has two tests: one for the parameters in the short run equations, and
the other for the parameters in the long run equation. The tests of parameter equivalence
were rejected for all of the tests except the test of low latitude and high latitude for the
long run parameters. Individual parameters were then tested for significant difference
across sub-samples using the adjusted Wald test. This narrowed down the number of
structural differences across the sub-samples to specific parameters.

Table 15
Adjusted Wald Test Results for Sample Splits
Sample Splits
Ho: Confidence in government SR = No confidence in government SR
Ho: Confidence in government LR = No confidence in government LR
Ho: Low latitude SR = High latitude SR
Ho: Low latitude LR = High latitude LR
Ho: WTP SR = WTA SR
Ho: WTP LR = WTA LR
Null hypothesis that split samples are not different
*Significant at p = 0.05

Prob. > F
0.11
0.10
0.75
0.00*
0.08
0.08

One way to handle these statistical differences of parameters across split samples
is the use of interaction variables. One of the pitfalls of including many interactions terms
is multicollinearity. Additionally, some interaction terms can have no theoretical
interpretation. A small number of interaction terms were tested to determine if they were
significant in the model.
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Table 16 presents the interaction terms and the p values associated with each. All
of the interaction variables in Table 16 were omitted because of lack of significance. Two
other interaction terms were considered. An interaction action between no belief in
climate change and no confidence in government was tested in the model. This
interaction terms was omitted from the model because for the long run equation no
standard errors could be obtained. It is believed this is due to mulicollinearity caused by a
high correlation between this interaction term and the no belief in climate change variable
(correlation = 0.7213). The other interaction term between no belief in climate change
and protection from climate change perceived benefits was considered. After the creation
of this variable it was found that all the observations became 0, indicating that the two
were mutually exclusive and there was no interaction between the two. Though an
interaction term was not implemented into the model to account for the lack of parameter
equivalence for low latitude long run equation and the high latitude long run equation, the
affect that low latitude has across the equations is estimated in the model through the
latitude variable.
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Table 16
Interaction Term Significance

Short run vs. No Action:

Long Run vs. No Action:

Interaction Terms
PreKnowledge*Government
Latitude*Income-Bid
Latitude*HurrFreqHI
WTP*Income-Bid
Government*Income-Bid

P> |z|
0.13
0.20
0.18
0.69
0.89

PreKnowledge*Government
Latitude*Income-Bid
Latitude*HurrFreqHI
WTP*Income-Bid
Government*Income-Bid

0.29
0.18
0.16
0.52
0.43

Test of Parameter Equivalence
The model was also tested to determine if there was statistical differences in the
parameters across the short run and long run equations. This was performed using
adjusted Wald tests. The results of the adjusted Wald tests are shown in Table 17. The
test results show that only the parameters for age, climate change benefit, question order
dummy, and willingness to pay dummy were significant, indicating statistical difference
across the two equations. Linear constraints were then placed on the model that forced
the parameters of all other variables to be equal across the short run and long run
regression equations.
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Table 17
Adjusted Wald Tests for the Null Hypotheses that Each of the Parameters
is Equal Across Short Run and Long Run Equations
Parameter Tests
Ho: Income-Bid SR =Income-Bid LR
Ho: Gender SR = Gender LR
Ho: Race SR = Race LR
Ho: Age SR = Age LR
Ho: Household SR = Household LR
Ho: Education SR = Education LR
Ho: Latitude SR = Latitude LR
Ho: StormBenefit SR = StormBenefit LR
Ho: EnvironmentBenefit SR = EnvironmentBenefit LR
Ho: CCBenefit SR = CCBenefit LR
Ho: CCperception SR = CCperception LR
Ho: PreKnowledge SR = PreKnowledge LR
Ho: Government SR = Government LR
Ho: Influence SR = Influence LR
Ho: RiskPref SR = RiskPref LR
Ho: HurrFreqHI SR = HurrFreqHI LR
Ho: LongRunFirst SR = LongRunFirst LR
Ho: WTP SR = WTP LR
*Significant at p = 0.05

Prob. > chi2
0.25
0.09
0.75
0.00*
0.81
0.81
0.31
0.37
0.31
0.02*
0.46
0.56
0.07
0.44
0.51
0.63
0.00*
0.04*

Test of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
The model was also tested to determine if the assumption of independence of
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) was valid. Independence of irrelevant alternatives means that
an individual’s decision between two choices is not affected if a third (irrelevant) choice
is introduced. The common test for this is the Hausman test, but because the likelihood
function contained probability weights, a generalized Hausman was necessary, which in
this case is an adjusted Wald test. Table 18 shows the IIA hypotheses tests that were
performed. The adjusted Wald test indicated that the assumption holds for both short run
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and long run equations, because the tests failed to reject the null hypotheses that the
unrestricted and restricted models are equal.

Table 18
Adjusted Wald Tests for the Hypotheses of
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
Null Hypotheses
Ho: Unrestricted Model Short Run Equation Parameters =
Restricted Short Run Equation Parameters
Ho: Unrestricted Model Long Run Equation Parameters =
Restricted Long Run Equation Parameters
*Significant at p = 0.05
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Prob. > F
0.07
0.75

CHAPTER VI
RESULTS

The results from the multinomial logit model discussed in the previous chapter are
presented in this chapter. The marginal effects, relative risk ratios, and predicted
probabilities are covered here. This chapter also contains the willingness to pay and
willingness to accept estimates.

Coefficients, Standard Deviations, and Significance Levels
Table 19 presents the estimated parameter coefficients, standard deviations, and
significance levels for the multinomial logit model specified earlier, as well as measures
of the model’s fit. For convenience, also reported are the parameter coefficients of the
model with short run as the base to allow for ease of interpretation of short run vs. long
run. The parameter coefficients, standard deviations, and significance levels provided
allow for the comparison of the short run proposal vs. no action, the long run proposal vs.
no action, and the long run proposal vs. the short run proposal.
The decision to choose the short run proposal compared to no action is influenced by the
bounded income-bid, race, age, storm protection primary benefit, protection of
environment benefit, protection from climate change benefit, having previous knowledge
of restoration efforts, no confidence in government, and the treatment for willingness to
pay.
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Table 19
Estimated Coefficients, Standard Errors, and Significance Levels for the
Multinomial Logit Model
Short Run
(Base No Action)
Coef
SE
0.33 *** 0.10
0.05
0.32
0.76 ** 0.34
0.02
* 0.01
0.10
0.13
-0.06
0.20
0.09
0.17
2.33 *** 0.32
2.80 *** 0.53
1.26
* 0.67
-0.06
0.37
0.69 ** 0.33
-1.06 *** 0.32
0.11
0.41
0.23
0.34
0.00
0.36
0.00
0.29
-1.56 *** 0.31
-5.87
5.65

Long Run
Long Run
(Base No Action) (Base Short Run)
Coef
SE Coef
SE
0.33 *** 0.10
0.05
0.32
0.76 ** 0.34
-0.03 * 0.02 -0.05 *** 0.01
0.10
0.13
-0.06
0.20
0.09
0.17
2.33 *** 0.32
2.80 *** 0.53
2.46 *** 0.79 1.20 ** 0.60
-0.06
0.37
0.69 ** 0.33
-1.06 *** 0.32
0.11
0.41
0.23
0.34
0.00
0.36
-2.68 *** 0.72 -2.68 *** 0.69
-0.84 * 0.50 0.72
* 0.42
-5.62
5.68 0.26
0.75

Variables
Income-Bid1
Gender1
Race1
Age
Household1
Education1
Latitude1
StormBenefit1
EnvironmentBenefit1
CCBenefit
CCperception1
PreKnowledge1
Government1
Influence1
RiskPref1
HurrFreqHI1
LongRunFirst
WTP
Constant
Observations = 511
Log Pseudoliklihood = -282.80
Wald chi2(22) = 138.51
Prob > chi2 = 0.00
Pseudo R2 = 0.28
***, **, * Significant at p = 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10, respectively
1. Constrained to be equal across Short Run and Long Run Equations

The decision to choose the long run proposal compared to no action is influenced
by the bounded income-bid, race, age, storm protection primary benefit, protection of
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environment benefit, protection from climate change benefit, having previous knowledge
of restoration efforts, no confidence in government, question order and the treatment for
willingness to pay. Age, protection from climate change benefits, question order, and the
willingness to pay treatment were the variables that influenced the decision between the
long run proposal and the short run proposal.

Marginal Effects
Table 20 presents the marginal effects for the variables in the model evaluated at
variable means. Also, the marginal effects for the binary variables are a discrete change
from the base. Respondents that were white were 8.61 percent more likely to choose the
short run proposal. As the respondent’s age increases by a year the probability of
choosing the short run proposal increases by 0.38 percent. Those respondents that stated
that protection from storms was their primary benefit of concern were 29.13 percent more
likely to choose the short run proposal. The probability of choosing the short run proposal
increases by a probability of 22.94 percent if respondents stated that protection of the
environment was the benefit that they were primarily concerned about when making there
decision. Having prior knowledge of restoration efforts underway made respondents 7.81
percent more likely to choose the short run proposal. Respondents that were presented
with the long run proposal first were 8.79 percent more likely to choose the short run
proposal. Yet, respondents that had no confidence in government were 11.52 percent less
likely to choose the short run proposal. Also, if the respondents received the willingness
to pay payment mechanism the probability of choosing short run decreases by 20.49
percent.
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Table 20
Average Marginal Effects Shown as Percentage Changes
Variables
Short Run
Long Run
No Action
Income-Bid*
0.0009%
0.0001%
-.0010%
1
Gender
0.55
0.06
-0.61
8.61
0.96
-9.56
Race1
1
Age
0.38
-0.23
-0.15
Household
1.07
0.12
-1.19
Education
-0.58
-0.07
0.65
Latitude
0.94
0.10
-1.04
1
StormBenefit
29.13
2.91
-32.04
1
EnvironmentBenefit
22.94
2.40
-25.35
CCBenefit1
2.30
11.39
-13.69
1
-0.65
-0.07
0.72
CCperception
PreKnowledge1
7.81
0.87
-8.68
-11.52
-1.30
12.82
Government1
1
Influence
1.17
0.13
-1.30
1
2.39
0.27
-2.65
RiskPref
1
HurrFreqHI
-0.04
0.00
0.04
1
8.79
-11.35
2.56
LongRunFirst
1
WTP
-20.49
2.24
18.25
*For a $1,000 change in income
1: dy/dx for the binary variables is a discrete change from the base

As the respondents age increase by a year the probability of them choosing the
long run proposal decreases by .23 percent. Respondents were 2.91 percent more likely to
choose the long run proposal when their primary benefit of concern was protection from
storms. Respondents were 2.4 percent more likely to choose the long run proposal when
their primary benefit was protection of the environment. If protection from the effects of
climate change was the respondent’s primary benefit of concern the probability of the
respondent choosing the long run proposal increase by 11.39 percent. If the respondent
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was presented with the long run proposal first then their probability of choosing the long
run proposal decreases by 11.35 percent.
As the respondents age increases by a year the probability of the respondent
choosing no action decreases by .15 percent. The probability of choosing no action also
decreases by 32.04 percent when protection from storm was primary concern when
making their choice. The probability of choosing no action decreases by 25.35 percent
when protection of the environment is their primary benefit. The probability also
decreases by 13.69 percent if protection from the effects climate change was their
primary benefit. The probability of choosing no action increases by 12.82 percent if the
respondent has no confidence in government. The probability of choosing no action also
increases by 18.25 percent if the respondent received the willingness to pay payment
mechanism.

Relative Risk Ratios
Table 21 presents the relative risk ratios or odds ratios associated with these
parameter coefficients. The ratios are presented as percentage difference from the base
option in the decision. The relative risk ratios represent the relative increase or decrease
in the probability of observing the selected option relative to the base option. The
mathematical equation for the calculation of the relative risk ratios is RRR

§ Y | x1 ·
¸.
Pr¨¨
2 ¸
©Y | x ¹

Relative risk ratios are presented for all the variables in the model, but the ratios that
correspond to variables that are significant are shown in bold.
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Starting with variables that were shown to be significant for the decision between
the short run proposal vs. no action, it was observed that individuals are 0.82 percent
more likely to choose short run over no action for every $1,000 increase in income.
Respondents that are white are 114 percent more likely to choose the short run proposal
over no action being taken. As age increases by a year the probability of the respondent
choosing the short run proposal over no action increases by 1.78 percent. If respondents
stated that protection from storms was the primary benefit in mind when making the
decision they were 932 percent more likely to choice short run over no action.
Respondents that said protection of the environment was their primary benefit of concern
then they were 1549 percent more likely to choose short run over no action. Respondents
that stated protection against sea-level rise due to climate change as primary benefit of
concern were 254 percent more likely to choose short run over no action. If the
respondent answered that they had previous knowledge of restoration efforts taking place
in coastal Louisiana they are 100 percent more likely to choose the short run proposal
over no action. Respondents that had no confidence in the government to accomplish
wetland loss prevention were 65 percent less likely to choose the short run proposal over
the no action. Also, if respondents were given the payment mechanism of willingness to
pay rather than the willingness to accept mechanism the probability of choosing short run
over no action decreases by 79 percent.
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Table 21
Relative Risk Ratios (interpreted as a percentage change from the
base; base category is listed second)
Short Run
vs.
Variables
No action
Income-Bid
0.82%*
Gender
5.38%
Race
114.17%
Age
1.78%
Household
10.67%
Education
-5.40%
Latitude
9.31%
StormBenefit
931.95%
EnvironmentBenefit
1548.57%
CCBenefit
253.71%
CCperception
-5.92%
PreKnowledge
99.67%
Government
-65.20%
Influence
11.85%
RiskPref
25.24%
HurrFreqHI
-0.34%
LongRunFirst
-0.02%
WTP
-78.93%
Ratios for significant are shown in bold
* For a $1,000 change in income

Long Run
vs.
No Action
0.82%*
5.38%
114.17%
-2.79%
10.67%
-5.40%
9.31%
931.95%
1548.57%
1075.83%
-5.92%
99.67%
-65.20%
11.85%
25.24%
-0.34%
-93.17%
-56.64%

Long Run
vs.
Short Run

-4.49%

232.43%

-93.17%
105.77%

The bounded income-bid, race, storm protection primary benefit, protection of
environment benefit, previous knowledge of restoration efforts, and confidence in
government variables are the significant relative risk ratios that have the same effect in
the decision of the long run proposal over no action as in the decision of the short run
proposal over no action. When age increases by a year the probability of the respondent
choosing the long run proposal over no action decreases by 2.79 percent. If respondents
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stated that protection from climate change was the primary benefit of concern they were
1076 percent more likely to choose the long run proposal over no action. If the long run
proposal was presented first the respondent was 93 percent less likely to choose the long
run proposal over no action. If respondents were given the payment mechanism of
willingness to pay rather than the willingness to accept mechanism the probability of
choosing long over no action decreases by 57 percent.
The variables that had an effect on the decision between the long run proposal
over the short run proposal were age, protection from climate benefit, question order, and
payment mechanism. As age increases by a year, the respondents are 4.49 percent less
likely to choose the long run proposal over the short run proposal. If respondents stated
that protection from climate change was the primary benefit of concern they were 232
percent more likely to choose the long run proposal over the short run proposal.
Respondents that were presented with the long run proposal first were 93 percent less
likely to choose the long run proposal over the short run proposal. Respondents were 106
percent more likely to choose the long run proposal over the short run proposal if the
payment mechanism received was willingness to pay.

Predicted Probabilities
Table 22 shows the probabilities of choosing the short run proposal, long run
proposal, and no action that were predicted using the model and the percentage of actual
responses for each of the three proposals. There is little difference between the predicted
probabilities and actual responses given on the survey.
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Table 22
Predicted Probabilities of Proposal Preference
Compared to Actual Responses

Predicted Probabilities

Short
Run
71.99%

Long
Run
6.85%

No
Action
21.16%

Actual Responses

72.41%

6.65%

20.94%

The predicted probabilities of the choice variable were obtained for each of the
options within each variable in the model, while holding all other variables constant.
Table 23 represents these probabilities. These two tables show the probabilities of
choosing one of the three proposals given a certain characteristic. Comparing the
predictive probabilities of the options within a variable provides insight into how certain
characteristics affect an individual’s preference between the three proposals.
For instance, respondents that were white had substantially larger probabilities of
choosing the short run proposal and smaller probability of choosing no action than did
those individuals that were nonwhite. These probabilities show that as age increases the
probability of choosing short run increases and the probability of choosing long run
decreases.
Respondents that stated that they had no prior knowledge of restoration efforts
taking place in Louisiana had a 44.20 percent predicted probability of choosing the short
run proposal, but this probability increased to 55.06 percent for individuals that did have
previous knowledge of restoration efforts. Also, individuals that had no prior knowledge
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were predicted to choose no action 52.19 percent of the time, while the probability of
choosing no action decreased to 40.32 for those respondents that had prior knowledge.

Table 23
Predicted Probabilities of Proposal Preference

Gender:

Variables
Male
Female

Short Run
72.21%
71.69%

Long Run
6.88%
6.82%

No Action
20.91%
21.49%

Race:

White
Nonwhite

73.75%
65.45%

7.03%
6.09%

19.21%
28.46%

Age:

30
40
50
60
70
80

61.92%
66.95%
71.32%
75.06%
78.22%
80.90%

13.78%
9.99%
7.04%
4.84%
3.27%
2.18%

24.30%
23.07%
21.64%
20.10%
18.51%
16.92%

Household size:

1
2
3
4
5 and up

70.32%
71.36%
72.37%
73.35%
74.30%

6.64%
6.76%
6.88%
6.99%
7.10%

23.04%
21.87%
20.75%
19.66%
18.60%

Education:

1. High school or below
2. Associates or
bachelors
3. Beyond a bachelors

72.36%
71.81%

6.90%
6.84%

20.74%
21.36%

71.25%

6.77%

21.98%

29 degree
30 degree
31 degree
32 degree
33 degree

70.43%
71.35%
72.24%
73.10%
73.94%

6.69%
6.79%
6.89%
6.99%
7.08%

22.88%
21.86%
20.87%
19.91%
18.98%

Latitude:
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Table 23 (Continued)
Short
Run
81.33%
53.45%

Long
Run
7.83%
4.93%

No
Action
10.84%
41.62%

Environment important
benefit
Otherwise

83.13%

8.05%

8.82%

46.67%

4.30%

49.03%

Climate change important
benefit
Otherwise

63.55%

20.87%

52.73%

15.58
%
4.40%

Climate Change:

No Belief
Believe

51.95%
52.89%

4.32%
4.41%

43.73%
42.70%

Prior Knowledge:

Prior knowledge
No Prior Knowledge

55.06%
44.20%

4.62%
3.61%

40.32%
52.19%

Government:

No Confidence
Confidence

43.97%
60.55%

3.60%
5.15%

52.44%
34.30%

Influence:

Believe responses matter
Do not believe responses
matter

61.90%
60.22%

5.28%
5.12%

32.82%
34.66%

Risk Preference:

No gamble
Gamble

61.57%
58.15%

5.28%
4.95%

33.15%
36.90%

HurrHiFreq:

Believe in high hurricane
frequencies
Otherwise

60.53%

5.15%

34.31%

60.58%

5.16%

34.26%

Question order:

Long Run First
Short Run First

63.53%
57.57%

0.75%
9.59%

35.72%
32.84%

WTP:

WTP
WTA

46.46%
73.67%

5.70%
4.70%

47.83%
21.64%

StormBenefit:

EnvironmentBenefit
:

ClimateChangeBenefit:

Variables
Storm important benefit
Otherwise
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42.87%

Respondents that claimed to have no confidence in government had 43.97 percent
probability of choosing the short run proposal, but those that had confidence in
government had a higher probability of 60.55 percent of choosing the short run proposal.
The probability of choosing no action for those that had no confidence in government
was 52.44 percent, while the probability of choosing no action decreases to 34.30 for
those that had confidence in government. Also, respondents that received the willingness
to accept payment mechanism were much more likely to choose the short run proposal
compared to those that received the willingness to pay payment mechanism. Those
respondents that did receive the willingness to pay payment mechanism had a 47.83
percent probability of choosing no action, while those that received the willingness to
accept payment mechanism had a 21.64 percent probability of choosing no action.

Welfare Estimates

Parametric Estimates
Median willingness to pay and median willingness to accept estimates were
calculated using the procedure presented in Haab and McConnell (2002). The
mathematical equation for median willingness to pay is MD (WTPj )

yj
1  exp( x j Į )

,

where y is the mean income, x is the vector of means, and is Į a vector of the
parameters divided by the parameter of the income variable. The coefficients and means
for the variables in the previously discussed multinomial logit model were used to
calculate one set of WTP and WTA estimates. A multinomial probit model was also used
to generate another set of coefficients that allowed for a second set of median WTP and
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WTA estimates to be calculated. This allowed for a comparison of WTP and WTA
estimates generated assuming either the logistic or normal distribution on the error term.
Confidence intervals were generated using the Krinsky-Robb procedure (1986).
The procedure is outlined in Haab and McConnell (2002). The first step of the procedure
is to produce a K x K variance-covariance matrix for the estimated parameters of
ˆ Ȗˆ . Then from the variance-covariance matrix sub-matrixes
vector Ȗˆ , represented by V

for short run and long run were extracted and independence across the equations had to
assumed, because of the constraints on the model. C is the K x K lower diagonal matrix
ˆ Ȗˆ so that CC’ = V
ˆ Ȗˆ . The C matrix is often referred to as
of the square root of the V

the Cholesky decomposition matrix. It is also necessary to generate a K-dimensional
column vector of independent draws from a standard normal density function,
represented by x k . Then, using a single K-vector draw from the asymptotic distribution of
the parameters Ȗ d is: Ȗ d

Ȗˆ  C' x k . This is repeated N, number of random draws, times

to produce the simulation of the full distribution of the parameter vector Ȗ̂ distributed
ˆ Ȗˆ
N Ȗˆ , V

under ideal asymptotic conditions. The WTP estimate is then produced for

each N from the asymptotic distribution of the WTP function. In the procedure here N =
50,000, and the procedure was repeated for the two sets of multinomial parameters.
The willingness to pay and willingness to accept estimates here represent the
equivalent surplus and the compensating surplus, respectively, mentioned earlier. The
willingness to pay estimate here represents the amount of money the respondent is
willing to give up (in the form of a tax) to prevent the future wetland loss. Willingness to
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accept is the amount of money the respondent needs to receive (in the form of a tax
return) to accept the loss of the wetlands.
Table 24 shows the WTP and WTA estimates. The WTP and WTA estimates for
the multinomial logit and multinomial probit models do not vary greatly, indicating that
difference between the assumption of logistic and normal distribution on the error term
does not drastically affect the WTP and WTA estimates. The median willingness to pay
for the short run proposal is $3,943.45 using the multinomial logit model parameters and
$4,324.93 using the multivariate probit model. The willingness to accept estimate for the
short run proposal using the multinomial logit model’s coefficients is almost 14 times
higher than the WTP estimate. The 95 percent confidence interval for the WTP for the
short run proposal ranges from $1,493.10 to $33,066.96.

Table 24
Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept Estimates

Short Run:

WTP
WTA

Long Run:

WTP
WTA

Short Run:

Long Run:

Multinomial Logit
$3,943.45
$53,855.33

95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
$1,493.10
$33,066.96
$13,650.96
$60,429.85
$0.00
$0.11

$24.22
$168.95

WTP
WTA

$0.78
$10.11
Multinomial Probit
$4,324.93
$54,498.21

$1,626.79
$13,987.70

$38,167.33
$60,429.86

WTP
WTA

$1.74
$19.13

$0.00
$0.69

$30.35
$175.29
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To take a closer look at the WTP for the short run proposal, Figure 7 illustrates
the histogram of median willingness to pay values for the 50,000 willingness to pay
estimates generated using the Krinsky-Robb procedure. It is apparent that even though
the 95 percent confidence interval does yield a high upper bound, the majority of the
willingness to pay estimates actually fall between $0 and $20,000. Also, the parametric
WTP estimate for the short run proposal lies within this range of $0 to $20,000.
The reason that the WTP and WTA estimates for the short run proposal were so
high and the long run proposal were so low can be attributed to the very high number of
votes in favor of the short run proposal in comparison to the low number of votes in favor
of the long run proposal. For the WTP for the short run proposal this means that the bids
did not allow for an upper bound on WTP to be identified, thus the upper bound imposed
by the model, income, becomes binding. $60,429 is the mean income and thus the upper
bound on the distribution in Figure 7.

Turnbull Estimates
The Turnbull method is another way to calculate willingness to pay estimates.
This method is also called the lower bound method because it forces the upper bound to
be equal to the highest bid. Habb and McConnell (2002) describes the mathematical
framework that was laid out for the distribution-free estimator by Turnbull (1976),
Cosslett (1982), and Ayer et al.(1955). This method was first used in contingent valuation
studies by Carson, Hanemann et al. (1994) and Haab and McConnell (1997). The
Turnbull estimate is calculated as:
M*

E LB (WTP )

¦t . f
i

i 0
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*
j 1
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where ti is the bid, M* is the total number of bids after pooling bids to achieve a
monotonic income density function, and f j*1 is the probability that the willingness to pay

0

5.0e-05

Density
1.0e-04

1.5e-04

2.0e-04

lies between bid j and the next highest bid j + 1.
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Figure 7 Density of WTP Estimates using Generated Parameters from a Standard
Normal Distribution

The variance of the lower bound estimate is
M*

V ( E LB (WTP ))

¦

F j* (1  F j* )
T

i 0

*
j

(t j  t j  1) 2

36

M*

¦V ( F
i 0

81

*
j

)(t j  t j  1) 2 .

37

Using the bids and the responses to the trichotomous choice question the Turnbull
willingness to pay estimate for the short run proposal was calculated. The Turnbull WTP
estimate and its confidence intervals are shown in Table 25. It is evident that the Turnbull
WTP estimate for the short run proposal is lower than the parametric estimates. This is to
be expected since the Turnbull estimate has an upper bound of the highest bid and the
parametric estimates upper bound is mean income. Also, the long run willingness to pay
was incalculable due to the low number of observations and a monotonic income density
function could not be obtained.

Table 25
Turnbull Distribution Free WTP Estimates
for The Short Run Proposal
95% Confidence Interval
WTP Lower Bound Upper Bound
Preference $745.67
$742.34
$749.00

Net Present Value and Aggregate Estimates
Since the bids that respondents stated they would be willing to pay were
incremental installments over a 10 year period it is necessary to generate a net present
value for the median willingness to pay and median willingness to accept estimates using
different discount rates. The discount rates that were used to calculate the net present
values were elicited rates from the sample for illustration purposes. The discount rates
used for the net present value estimates were generated using responses to a question on
the survey. The respondents were given three questions where they chose between
receiving different lump-sum amounts or annual payments over 20 years for a
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hypothetical lottery price. Responses to these three questions were used to estimate an
implied discount rate for each respondent. Table 26 shows the frequency of respondents’
discount rates that fell within each of the four ranges.

Table 26
Implied Discount Rate Ranges Obtained From Sample

Less than 1.89%
Between 1.89% and 10.31%
Between 10.31% and 26.42%
26.42% or higher
Other
Total

Frequency
54
146
106
123
82
511

Percentage
10.57%
28.57%
20.74%
24.07%
16.05%

Table 27 shows the net present values for willingness to pay and willingness to
accept under each discount rate (midpoints were used for the two intermediate values)
plus one additional discount rate (50%).

Table 27
Net Present Values for the Short Run Willingness to Pay
and Willingness to Accept Estimates
Assumed Discount Rate
1.89%
6.10%
18.37%
26.42%
50.00%
WTP
$35,627.07 $28,887.09 $17,491.65 $13,494.51
$7,750.12
WTA
$486,556.17 $394,508.74 $238,882.12 $184,293.44 $105,842.80
Turnbull $6,736.73
$5,462.27
$3,307.50
$2,551.68
$1,465.47

Figure 8 illustrates the net present values for the willingness to pay estimates of
the short run proposal, the estimated confidence interval, and the Turnbull estimate.
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Figure 8 shows that the net present value of the parametric median willingness to pay, the
lower bound of willingness to pay, and the Turnbull estimate are all relatively close to
one another as the discount rate increases. It can also be seen that the gap between these
three measures and the upper bound of willingness to pay decreases as the discount rate
increases.

$350,000
$300,000

Median
Lower
Upper
Turnbull

NPV of WTP

$250,000
$200,000
$150,000
$100,000
$50,000
$0
0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

Discount Rate

Figure 8 Net Present Value of Willingness to Pay for the Short Run Proposal

Figure 9 illustrates these net present values for the willingness to accept estimates
of the short run proposal, the estimated confidence interval, and the Turnbull estimate.
Figure 9 shows that the net present value of the median willingness to accept and the
upper bound of willingness to pay are relatively close to one another, while not within
close proximity to the lower bound and the Turnbull estimate. Also, from both Figure 8
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and Figure 9 it is evident that as the discount rate increases difference between the
median willingness to pay and accept estimates, their confidence intervals, and the
Turnbull estimates decreases.
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Figure 9 Net Present Value of Willingness to Accept for the Short Run Proposal

Estimates of aggregate willingness to pay and willingness to accept values can be
calculated by multiplying net present value WTP and WTA estimates by the number of
federal tax returns for the State of Louisiana. The total number of Federal tax returns for
Louisiana in 2007 was 2,146,273 (IRS, 2010). Table 28 presents the aggregate
willingness to pay, aggregate willingness to accept, and aggregate Turnbull estimate
calculated using the 2007 number of Federal income tax returns for Louisiana and the net
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present value estimates from Table 27. The aggregate Turnbull estimates are the lowest
of the three, and the willingness to accept estimates are still the highest.

Table 28
Aggregate Welfare Estimates in Millions of Dollars

WTP NPV
WTA NPV
Turnbull NPV

1.89%
$76,465
$1,044,282
$14,459

Assumed Discount Rate
6.10%
18.37%
26.42%
$62,000
$37,542
$28,963
$846,723 $512,706 $395,544
$11,724
$7,099
$5,477

50.00%
$16,634
$227,168
$3,145

A more conservative approach is to assume a $0 WTP/WTA for non-respondents,
see Petrolia and Kim (2009). Table 29 shows the calculated aggregate estimates assuming
that the individuals that did not return the survey (i.e., non-respondents) had a $0
WTP/WTA for the short run proposal. Table 29 shows that making the assumption of $0
for non-respondents drastically reduces these aggregate estimates.

Table 29
Aggregate Welfare Estimates in Millions of Dollars
Assuming $0 WTP/WTA for Non-Respondents

WTP NPV
WTA NPV
Turnbull NPV

1.89%
$17,358
$237,052
$3,282

Assumed Discount Rate
6.10%
18.37%
26.42%
$14,074
$8,522
$6,575
$192,206 $116,384 $89,788
$2,661
$1,611
$1,243

50.00%
$3,776
$51,567
$713

Summary of Results
The marginal effects indicate that respondents that were white, protection from
storm benefits being primary concern, environment protection benefits primary concern,
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prior knowledge, being presented with long run first, and/or as age increases were more
likely to choose the short run proposal. Having no confidence in government or the
willingness to pay payment mechanism decreased the probability of choosing the short
run proposal.
The probability of respondents choosing the long run proposal increases if
respondents stated protection from storm benefits being primary benefit of concern,
environment protection benefits primary concern, or if protection from the effects of
climate change was their primary benefit. As age increases or if respondents were
presented with the long run proposal first their probability of choosing the long run
proposal decreases.
The marginal effects show that as age increases the probability of choosing no
action decreases, and the probability of choosing no action decreases if the respondent’s
primary benefit is protection from the effects of climate change. The probability of the
respondents choosing no action increases if respondents had no confidence in
government.
Results indicate that the respondents were heavily in favor of the short run
proposal as compared to the long run proposal and no action being taken. The results
show that respondents that were wealthier, whiter, older, protection from storms primary
benefit, protection of the environment primary benefit, protection from the effects of
climate change primary benefit, and/or had previous knowledge of restoration efforts
taking place in Louisiana were more likely to choose the short run proposal option over
no action. Having no confidence in government and receiving the payment mechanism
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willingness to pay made respondents less likely to choose the short run proposal no
action.
Factors that affected the decision between the long run proposal and no action
differed slightly from the previous decision. The factors that made respondents more
likely to choose the long run proposal over no action were being wealthier, white, stated
protection from storms primary benefit, protection of the environment primary benefit,
protection from the effects of climate change primary benefit, and/or having previous
knowledge of restoration efforts taking place in Louisiana. Being older, having no
confidence in government, being presented with the long run proposal first, and/or
receiving the payment mechanism willingness to pay caused respondent’s probability of
choosing the long run proposal over no action to decrease.
When it came to making the decision between the long run proposal and the short
run proposal the variables that made the respondent more likely to choose the short run
proposal were being older and being presented with the long run proposal first. The
probability of respondents choosing the long run proposal over the short run proposal
increased when protection from the effects of climate change primary benefit and/or
receiving willingness to pay payment mechanism instead of the willingness to accept.
The willingness to pay and willingness accept estimates indicate that respondents
place a far higher value on the short run proposal than on the long run proposal. Also,
through the use of confidence intervals on the willingness to pay and willingness to
accept estimates for the short run proposal it is apparent that both have fairly wide
confidence intervals. Also, Figure 7 illustrates that, though the confidence interval is
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broad, the majority of willingness to pay estimates taken from the Krinsky-Robb
procedure fall between $0 and $20,000.
The Turnbull willingness pay estimate was calculated for the short proposal and
was found to be almost $3,000 lower than the parametric willingness to pay calculated
for the short run proposal. This is not surprising since the Turnbull estimates is
considered to be a lower bound estimate of willingness to pay.
Also, the net present values show the willingness to pay and willingness to accept
estimates are affected by the discount rate that is assumed. Figures 8 and 9 illustrate that
as the discount rate increases the gap between the willingness to pay and willingness to
accept, their confidence intervals, and the Turnbull estimate shrinks.
By calculating the aggregate net present values of willingness to pay, willingness
to accept, and Turnbull estimates for the short run proposal the value that the population
of Louisiana places on the short run proposal is obtained. Also, by assuming a $0 value
for the surveys that were not returned these estimates drastically decrease.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS

This thesis presents estimates of the value that Louisiana residents place upon the
prevention of future wetland loss was obtained. The preference between the three
proposal options (short run proposal, long run proposal, and no action) was the main
interest in this thesis. It was determined that the short run proposal was extremely
preferred to both no action and the long run proposal. Also, no action was preferred to the
long run proposal. The average median value was calculated for two types of wetland
loss prevention, the short run proposal and the long run proposal. The median annual
willingness to pay for the short proposal is $3,943, with a confidence interval of $1,493
to $33,067, using the parameter estimates from the multinomial logit model. The median
willingness to pay for the short run proposal exceeded the bid range that was presented in
the survey. A Turnbull lower-bound estimate was also generated to provide a more
conservative estimate of the value of the short run proposal. Turnbull estimates are
considered a lower bound estimate because its upper bound is constrained by the highest
bid value. The Turnbull estimate of the short run proposal was $745.34.
Since the bid was presented as a tax that would be paid incrementally over a ten
year, a net present value had to be calculated using these estimates. Then using these net
present values and a discount rate calculated from responses of the survey, the aggregate
willingness to pay was determined. The net present values of willingness to pay for short
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run, using the 18.37% discount rate, are $17,492 for the median willingness to pay and
$3,308 for the Turnbull estimate. The aggregate values for willingness to pay and
Turnbull, using these net present values, are $37.5 billion and $7.1 billion, respectively.
Yet, these aggregate values decrease drastically if the assumption is made that all survey
non-respondents have a WTP/WTA value of $0 for the proposal. When this assumption is
made the aggregate median willingness to pay decreases to $8.5 billion and the Turnbull
estimate decreases to $1.6 billion. Depending on what assumption is made for the
discount rate and the value of non-respondents, very different willingness to pay
estimates for the short run proposal were obtained.
The willingness to accept estimates were extremely high compared to the
willingness to pay estimates. The willingness to accept estimates for the short run
proposal were almost 15 times greater than the willingness to pay estimates. The
willingness to pay estimates being higher than willingness to pay is consistent with the
literature and not too surprising, but what was somewhat surprising was the magnitude of
the difference being so great.
The willingness to pay and willingness to accept estimates for the long run
proposal were extremely small. Neither of the estimates for the value of the long run
proposal reached $12. This is dramatically less than the values that were calculated for
the short run. This is primarily due to the minimal respondents voting for the long run
proposal.
Many of the same factors caused respondents to choose either the short run
proposal or the long run proposal over no action. Large increases in income, being white,
respondents being concerned about protection from storms, protection of environment,
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protection against sea-level rise due to climate change, and having prior knowledge of
restoration efforts taking place in Coastal Louisiana all increased the probability the
respondent of preferring either the short run proposal or the long run proposal over no
action. No confidence in government and receiving the willingness to pay payment
mechanism were the factors that caused individuals to be less likely to choose either the
short run or the long run proposal over no action.
One factor that differed across the two options over no action is age. Older
respondents were more likely to support the short run proposal over no action. One
interpretation of this is that the long run proposal does not provide benefits until farther
into the future and older respondents believed they would not receive the benefits from
the long run proposal. Therefore, the older respondents were less likely to support the
long run proposal.
One major factor that was driving respondents support for the short run proposal
was respondent’s primary concern being protection from storms. Also, the majority of
respondents had a skewed perception that category 3 hurricanes were going to affect
them at least once in 10 years, when actual return period for a category 3 hurricane in
Coastal Louisiana is about once every 37.5 years (NHC, 2010). The combination of
respondents believing that preventing wetland loss will yield hurricane protection
benefits with the high hurricane frequency expectations is driving the support for the
short run proposal and its associated willingness to pay estimates.
This study had a few weaknesses. First there was some sample bias due to poor
population representativeness. The sample was older, whiter, more male, more educated,
and wealthier than the population. Sample weights were placed on the model in an
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attempt to make the sample more representative of the population. Also, the response rate
for the survey was fairly low at 22.7%. Another weakness was that the bids presented in
the survey were too low, especially for the willingness to accept questions. This was
evident due to the fact that as the bids increased the frequency of “Yes” responses, for
some form of wetland loss prevention, did not begin to decrease.
These findings can be of use to policy makers when deciding which types of
restoration projects to undertake for the prevention of wetland loss in Louisiana. These
findings provide those policy makers with insight into the value that the population
Louisiana places on such projects. Policy makers can also determine the reasons why
their constituents support or do not support projects such as the ones analyzed in this
thesis.
This thesis shows that the population of Louisiana places a high value on the
prevention of the loss of their coastal wetlands. It also finds that the residents of
Louisiana highly prefer projects that will prevent losses sooner as compared to later.
Future research on this topic could determine if the support for these proposals
diminishes the farther Hurricanes Katrina and Rita move into the past. This could be done
through a similar survey performed farther into the future. This would determine if
concern for storm protection diminishes over time and if so, how this change would
affect the support for such proposals as the ones in this study.
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